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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Saint Louis University

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The HISTORICAL BULLETIN

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Vol. XXVI

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Toward a New Atlantis

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THE second World War left a power vacuum in Europe comparable, perhaps, to that following the fall of the Roman Empire. On VE-Day the disintegration of the European state system was complete, and Britain was mortally weakened. In the preliminary negotiations of the Big Three at Teheran and Yalta, Soviet Russia's "security needs" had been duly recognized and only the American Army in Europe stood between the Soviet and the bloodless conquest of the Christian West on a wave of anti-fascism. The ideological temper of American democracy, still ignorant of the material reason why the United States went to war in 1917 and in 1941, was bent on creating a new universal league of nations at no matter what cost, and as the exigencies of American economy decreed the withdrawal of American forces from Europe, the Soviet colossus moved into the European vacuum.

The sterile diplomacy of the United Nations during the last four years would make somber reading were it not that the pressure of public opinion, antagonized by Soviet intransigence, has provided motive power for revolutionizing American foreign policy. The idea of a world federation based not on power but on free consent has been discarded as impracticable. So long as the human race does not recognize common moral standards, the Wilsonian ideal of a democratic world parliament may still be cherished as a beautiful utopia, but measured by political realism and human experience, it is, without the necessary substructure of a democratic world community, a dangerous illusion and a siren of disaster. World federation in the present state of human affairs would automatically involve the United States in commitments out of all proportion to the nation's power. It is the negation of an American foreign policy, which should consist in bringing into balance the nation's commitments and its power. Shorn of any universalist democratic ideology, the motive of the United States in going to war in 1917 and again in 1941 was that American vital security was jeopardized by the rise on the other side of the Atlantic of a power bent on expansion at the expense of the American way of life.¹

In 1917 Americans generally failed to grasp the issue because President Wilson preferred not to particularize: it was a war to save the world for democracy. In 1941 Americans failed to understand because isola-

tionism blinded them to the fact that it was a "war for survival." Today the expansionist power facing America across the Atlantic is no longer Germany but Russia, and in a backhanded way Americans have to thank Molotov and the Comintern for the restoration of a moral sanity which has expressed itself in America in the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan, in Europe in the movement toward Western European union, and on both sides of the Atlantic in a common realization of the immediate need of a transatlantic union of America and Western Europe in a genuine Atlantic community.

That European anarchy is the cause of the wars which twice in our lifetime demanded American active participation is now accepted as a canon no less of American than of Western European foreign policy. The answer to this European anarchy is to bring into being what the Spanish thinker, Madariaga, called a new Atlantis or political fortification of the West, an Atlantic system based upon a union of the United States and of a Western European federation. Such a system would make the Atlantic area of the present the equivalent of the Mediterranean area of the past. Unlike the non-existent world community which the Covenant of the League of Nations or even the Constitution of the United Nations presupposed, the Atlantic community is a real historic community, a survival into our times of what in the Middle Ages men called Christendom.

The Christian Commonwealth was coterminous with Europe, deriving unity from a synthesis of the Graeco-Roman traditions of liberty and law, the Christian maxim of charity, and the spiritualized feudal concept of gentlemanliness. In modern times this Commonwealth, though semi-secularized, turned the Atlantic Ocean into an inland sea. So strong was its underlying unity that in spite of the forced political separation of North and South America from Europe, the interchange of political and cultural ideas as well as of commerce has been so persistent that the jugular vein of Western Europe lies between New York and London. The Truman doctrine, a belated recognition of these facts, permits the fashioning of an American foreign policy that consults at once the national interest and the welfare of the world. America's position is in the international community of Western Christendom of which the Atlantic is the inland sea.

The Soviet rape of Czechoslovakia was not an unqualified tragedy because it served final notice to the Western world that only through European union could

¹ Ross Hoffman. "Europe and the Atlantic Community." *Thought*, XX (1945), 22 ff. Walter Lippman, *U. S. Foreign Policy*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), 9 ff.

Soviet power be contained and World War III be rendered remote, or avoided altogether.

The reaction in the West was fast, intelligent, and, for the first time in many months, courageous. On March 2 Mr. Bevin announced to the House of Commons the decision of Western European statesmen to form a Western European union—economic, political, social, and military. On March 4 Lord Vansittart urged the closest union between Britain and the United States. American strength, he insisted, alone restrained Russian aggression. On March 5 the representatives of Britain, France, and the Benelux customs union (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) met in Brussels to form the nucleus of European union.

A draft treaty, signed March 17, lays the cornerstone for an eventual interlocking European union; it provides for permanent military and economic coordination, an eventual economic merger, a super-council which will meet continuously, and an international supreme court. So far the most difficult problem has been that of integrating British and European economy without affecting Britain's system of imperial preferences and so leading to the disintegration of the Empire and Commonwealth. The remarkable change in the attitude of France towards Germany is a tribute to American and British diplomacy. On a British-American resolution to maintain economic control of the Ruhr, France agreed to its political inclusion in Western Germany and to the application of the Marshall plan to the whole.

President Truman swiftly endorsed the Brussels pact as the beginning of that wider European union encouraged by Secretary of State Marshall's offer of economic assistance to Europe (ERP), and by the joint Congressional resolution introduced last year by Senator Fulbright of Arkansas and Representative Boggs of Louisiana, "that the Congress hereby favors the creation of a United States of Europe within the framework of the United Nations." That this wider union may be in the offing was indicated on March 8 when the steering committee of the sixteen nations participating in ERP met in Paris to set up a permanent organization for economic, cultural, and political collaboration and unanimously endorsed Mr. Bevin's proposal that Western Germany "be fully associated with the work of our continuing organization." A Portuguese move to bring Spain into the ERP was not received in an unfriendly spirit and its realization seems not remote. Europe with the kindly advice and assistance of the United States is thus demonstrating that the apocalyptic drama of war, famine, and plague can be ended only by European union.

True, the road from economic and military collaboration of the sixteen nations through a customs union to an eventual political federation will be long and difficult. There are barriers of national diversities and historic hatreds, French fears of strong Germany, Scandinavia's traditional neutrality, the diehard tradition of the balance of power, and Eastern Europe's enslavement. This last unhappy fact lends cogency to the current plea that "Free Europe" be used as a term for

the sixteen Marshall plan countries instead of "Western Europe." For ERP does not propose to divide Europe but to encourage the building of an all inclusive United States of Europe, a prosperous union of "Free Europe," acting as a magnet on the enslaved nations behind the iron curtain.

The historic decision of American and European statesmen which has borne so much fruit in recent weeks is neither novel nor utopian. Many years ago Hilaire Belloc pointed out that Europe's malady in our time stemmed from the disruption of the Roman Empire and of the later unity of Christendom. The tradition of the *Pax Romana* or even of the medieval union of altar and throne has, in fact, been a most persistent one in eminent European minds from the days of St. Augustine.

In his *Civitas Dei* St. Augustine lamented the fact that he had not lived to witness the Roman Empire at the height of its power. "The whole human race," wrote Dante Alighieri at the zenith of the Middle Ages, "is organized to a single end; therefore we ought to have a single regulator or governor; . . . Between any two princes . . . there can be a dispute . . . Therefore it is right that there should be a judgment to which both can appeal . . . there must be a third party with wide enough jurisdiction to be superior to both."² Dante's political doctrine was rooted in the common belief of his times in the continued existence of the Roman Empire, the only really universal state that Western Christendom had known. He was, however, speaking only of the political constitution of medieval Christendom, for good medievalist that he was, he recognized the fact that Christendom was based not on one but on two universalist notions. The second of these was the otherworldliness of the *Civitas Dei* expressed by St. Augustine in the maxim *extra Ecclesia nulla est salus*.

The creation out of these two universalist conceptions of the constitution of Christendom, the Holy Roman Empire, was gradually regarded as God's divine plan for human governance. Its ideology was at once sacred and simple. God willed that men should live in spiritual and temporal unity. Church and Empire were His appointed forms for the union of mankind. Over the one He had set the Pope and over the other Caesar. The whole scheme was regarded as a theocratic empire based on "the solidarity of a baptized political society" destined to endure to the end of time. By the year 1100 Christendom had become aware of itself as was shown by its crusade against Islam, by its "truce of God" and "peace of God" movements, and by other signs of a growing conviction that Christian peoples should dwell together in peace.

Four centuries later this "divinely imposed union" was torn to pieces. From the very beginning the imperial state had encroached on the rights of the Church as is evidenced in the ecclesiastical Capitularies of Charlemagne long before the fatal struggle between pope and emperor as to the ultimate determining power in Christendom. Besides, the imperium had never succeeded in governing all of medieval Europe, because

² *Monarchia*, I, v, 9; x, 2.

(Please turn to page eighty-five)

Terms and Ideas: Altered Meaning in History

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IT IS A COMMONPLACE that written history reveals as much about the author's age as it does of the period about which he writes. This is so because all historical writing necessarily contains both objective and subjective elements. The objective element consists of the events, the ideas, the institutions, the chain of circumstances, or the persons whose existence and movement through time can be objectively ascertained and circumscribed by relatively scientific methods of investigation. The subjective element consists of the historian's selection of data, his assessment of its importance, his interpretation of its meaning, and his construction of the narrative from this subjectively treated material. Thus we always see the past through the lens of the historian's present.

This assessment of past happenings by present standards is more pronounced in the history of ideas than in other fields. The subjective element is larger; for the historian plays a more important role in treating of ideas than he does in writing political, economic, or diplomatic history. As a consequence, the interpretation of past ideas changes more frequently and more radically than do other kinds of historical writing. One chief reason for such change is that while terms continue in use through generations, their meanings gradually alter. The vessels remain, but their contents change from age to age—much like the constant change of water in a swimming pool.

A striking example of this mutable meaning is found in the term "natural law." In the thirteenth century natural law meant man's participation, through his reason, in divine law or wisdom. It was therefore a normative, moral law. In the eighteenth century the term "natural law" was on every "enlightened" person's lips, but it had come to mean something more like a physical than a normative law, more like gravitation than distributive justice. In the nineteenth century "natural law" came to have a socio-economic meaning, referring to such "natural laws" as those determining wages, prices or profits, the "law" of diminishing returns and so on. Although the emphasis is physical in modern times, the moral aspect of natural law is never completely eliminated. There remains the suspicion that he who bucks the law of supply and demand is sinning—against society if not God. A remark made by Representative Roe in Congress two years ago illustrates how "natural law" has changed in meaning: "I believe the law of supply and demand is a natural, divine, God-given law that cannot be set aside by man any more than we can stop the sun from shining or the tide from ebbing and flowing."

Mr. Roe and St. Thomas use the same term for quite different ideas. So it is, even more pronouncedly, with bodies of thought. A famous example here is the

Magna Charta, which was converted from a conservative charter into a modern document of liberty during the seventeenth-century struggle between crown and parliament. "Liberalism," to cite one more celebrated example, stands for a body of ideas that differ from generation to generation and from country to country. In the nineteenth century Liberals insisted on a severely delimited sphere of action for the state; today "Liberalism" is generally attached to a body of theory that enlarges the sphere of state functions to the brink of totalitarianism. Its ideas approximate more closely to the older Socialism; still it parades under a term formerly attached to theories which today would be labeled impossibly reactionary.

What causes this radical change of meaning in terms as they move through history? Are there any "laws" of historical movement that govern such changes? If the historian can know the causes of such change and the rules governing it in some general way, then he will be in a better position to diassociate terms from their latterly acquired meanings in order to show what they meant at any particular time they were used. We propose to see in the rest of this article how the term "physiocracy" changed in meaning from when it was first used in the 1760's, in the hope that such an investigation will suggest methods for distinguishing the subjective from the objective meaning of terms as they move through history.

I

Physiocracy was originally a social philosophy embracing what today would be included in economics, politics, sociology, and ethics. One of the Physiocrats defined his system as "nothing but the application of the natural order of government to society,"¹ as the etymology of the word implies—"government by laws of nature." François Quesnay, leader of the sect, pointed out that these laws are either physical or moral. Laws governing the rotation of crops, the health of the body, the obtaining of good harvests are physical laws, whereas those governing man's social relations with his fellows are primarily moral laws. On the basis of these "natural laws," physical and moral, the Physiocrats hoped to erect their perfect society.

For a brief time they were *à la mode* in France and throughout Europe. They possessed their own journal, *Éphémérides du citoyen*; they published a six-volume collection of their basic writings, *Physiocratie*; and they were called in as advisers by such benevolent despots as Catherine II of Russia and Leopold of Tuscany. Their theories were the subject of much discussion and of bit-

¹ "De l'utilité des discussions économiques," *Physiocratie* (Paris, 1768-69), IV, 9. I have not yet been able to determine who wrote this article.

ter debate with the result that by 1770, they were known by all the "enlightened" minds of Europe.

It seems unlikely that a body of thought so widely known and so clearly stated would be variously interpreted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Such, nevertheless, is the case. Recent works on the Physiocrats contain such diametrically opposed statements as these: Charles Bourthoumieux claims that "without a doubt their method is almost purely deductive and a prioristic;"² but John A. Mourant asserts that "all the Physiocrats are insistent upon the need of a scientific method based on observation and experimentation."³ C. J. Woolen believes that "they [the Physiocrats] were in line with the ideals set out by St. Thomas and the Schoolmen;"⁴ while on the other hand Jerome Mille claims that their thought is "profoundly positivistic and modern. . . . The thought which guided them differed very much from that of the medieval metaphysicians who undervalued the material world in order to concentrate only on scholastic abstractions."⁵ Max Beer says that physiocracy is "an attempt to rationalize medieval economic life in the light of the progress of philosophy and physical science since the sixteenth century;"⁶ whereas Georges Weulersse maintains that "the system of the Physiocrats is essentially a capitalistic system."⁷

II

These divergent interpretations of physiocracy resulted partly because the Physiocrats were not as tightly united on all points of doctrine as they believed. Every member of the school thought himself nothing but a follower of the group's "Confucius," François Quesnay, whose laconic statements the Physiocrats all sought to popularize and to expand. Contemporaries therefore hurled the derogatory term *secte* at the Physiocrats,⁸ and they would all have agreed with the later pronouncement of Adam Smith that their works "all follow implicitly, and without any sensible variation, the doctrine of Mr. Quesnai."⁹

Such estimates were based on misunderstanding and occasionally malice on the part of their opponents, and on ignorance on the part of the younger Physiocrats. The fact is that the Physiocrats wrote through the critical decade of transition in the Enlightenment, the 1760's, and that the older Quesnay was poorly understood by his followers.¹⁰ His method, his outlook, and

² *Le mythe de l'ordre naturel en économie politique depuis Quesnay* (Paris, 1935), p. 31.

³ *The Physiocratic Conception of Natural Law* (Dissertation submitted to Chicago University in 1940, printed in 1943), p. 18.

⁴ "Quesnay and the Physiocrats," *The Downside Review*, LXIV (January, 1946), 14.

⁵ *Un physiocrate oublié, G.-F. Le Trosne* (Paris, 1905), pp. 44-45.

⁶ *An Inquiry Into Physiocracy* (London, 1939), p. 189.

⁷ *Le mouvement physiocratique en France* (Paris, 1910). This statement is to be found in the analytical table of contents under "Conclusion générale."

⁸ See, for example, Abbé de Mably, "Du commerce des grains," *Collection complète des oeuvres de l'abbé de Mably*, XIII, 296; Baron de Grimm, *Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique*, Pt. I, Vol. V (February, 1766), 480; Linguet's *Théorie du libelle* (quoted in Joseph Garnier, "Physiocrats," *Dictionnaire de l'économie politique*, II, 361).

⁹ *Wealth of Nations* (Everyman's Library edition), II, 173.

¹⁰ For a fuller discussion of this point see my article, "Quesnay and Physiocracy," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, IX (April, 1948).

the meaning he gave to such terms as "natural law" were different from those of the later leaders of the physiocratic school: Le Mercier de la Rivière, Du Pont, the Abbé Baudeau, and Le Trosne. These men did not read Quesnay's philosophical works, and they did not understand his views on economic questions, as Quesnay came to realize toward the end of his life.¹¹ It can even be stated that the content of physiocracy changed right in Quesnay's apartment and right under his eye.¹² For the book Le Mercier composed in Quesnay's rooms, the famous *L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques*, was clearly a book of the Enlightenment that Diderot could hail as containing all truths.¹³ Its conclusions are all arrived at deductively in Cartesian fashion; everything is clear and distinct, and no attention is paid to the world outside the author's mind. Quesnay had written in just the opposite fashion that "observation and experience should serve as two lights for dissipating obscurity,"¹⁴ and again that if you want to study agriculture in France and obtain more than "vague and imperfect ideas . . . consult the cultivators themselves."¹⁵

But Le Mercier's book came to summarize physiocracy for the younger Physiocrats and for the world. Du Pont called it "sublime,"¹⁶ and his fellows all looked on it as their bible. This book was not at all a faithful presentation of either Quesnay's method or his spirit, as Adam Smith mistakenly believed.¹⁷ It came, nevertheless, to stand for physiocracy permanently, since the aged Quesnay published only one more article on economics, spending the rest of his life on mathematical problems. In the last four years of the Physiocrats' heyday, from 1768 till 1772, books similar to Le Mercier's appeared, as did articles in *Éphémérides*. Meanwhile, Quesnay remained silent, and no one seemed to read Mirabeau's verbiage. So when physiocracy slipped into the oblivion of the past, it was Le Mercier's version of physiocratic thought rather than Quesnay's that was seen to disappear. Unfortunately for the truth, the two versions had been identified by the time physiocracy went into its temporary oblivion.

The causes for this disappearance of physiocracy

¹¹ This is a point curiously overlooked by students of physiocracy. But there can be no doubt about it. Quesnay's withdrawal from the school and Du Pont's failure to print Quesnay's articles already in his hands are only two indications of growing awareness on both sides of the rift between master and students.

¹² Quesnay had been trying to get someone to pull all his ideas together into systematic form. When Mirabeau's *Philosophie rurale* (1766) failed to accomplish this purpose, Quesnay and Mirabeau prevailed on Le Mercier to do the job in 1767. He worked in Quesnay's apartment, but neither Quesnay nor Mirabeau looked on the finished product enthusiastically.

¹³ Letter of September 6, 1768, to Falconet. In *Oeuvres complètes de Diderot* (Paris, 1875), XVIII, 273.

¹⁴ Quesnay's preface to "Mémoires de l'académie royale de chirurgie," in Auguste Oncken (ed.), *Oeuvres économiques et philosophiques de F. Quesnay* (Paris, 1888), p. 724.

¹⁵ Quesnay's article "Fermiers," which first appeared in the *Encyclopédie*. In Oncken, *op. cit.*, 38, 159-160.

¹⁶ *Physiocratie*, III, 15. Diderot prevailed on Du Pont to condense Le Mercier's book for further popularization under the title "De l'origine et du progrès d'une science nouvelle," which was put into *Physiocratie*.

¹⁷ Smith called Le Mercier's book "the most distinct and best connected account of this doctrine." *Op. cit.*, II, 173. There is good reason for believing that Smith never saw Le Mercier's book.

(Please turn to page eighty-seven)

The Siege of Antioch in the First Crusade

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THE MILITARY HISTORY of the First Crusade records many campaigns and battles in which the fighting men of the West participated, but without doubt, the longest, the hardest, and aside from Jerusalem itself, the most influential on future developments was the siege and capture of Antioch in the fall, winter and spring of 1097-1098. For Antioch was more than merely a military victory; it was the turning point in the development of the First Crusade away from Pope Urban's original intentions.

From his speech at Clermont¹ and from his subsequent letters to the crusaders, the Pope's program for the crusade stands out clearly. Primarily, the goal was the recovery of the Holy Land from the infidel. But he realized and intended that from the methods to be employed toward attaining this goal, further benefits might accrue. In his enthusiasm he planned to send forth armies inspired by his own conception of a religious war against the infidels, in which all Christians, Greek and Latin, could join. The pope hoped that the Greeks and the Latins could again unite in one Church, and that once the schism was healed, all Christians could work for the liberation of the Holy Sepulchre.² He mentioned in his letters to the crusaders, therefore, the plight of the Eastern churches and singled out the liberation of these churches as one of the major objectives of the expedition. He proposed to make no distinction between Greek and Latin Christians, but regarded them as common members of one fold, of which the pope at Rome was the proper shepherd. Urban's plan for the Crusade, therefore, was based on the mutual cooperation of the Greeks and the Latins for the great undertaking.³

Towards this end Urban had established friendly relations with the Eastern emperor, Alexius, long before the speech at Clermont.⁴ All preparations for the march to Constantinople, which was the point of rendezvous for the western armies, were made with the idea of cooperation in mind. On the march the crusaders were not as disorderly as has been commonly assumed. The accounts of the chroniclers are colored with the hatred which developed later, but there are suggestions that the original attitude of the Westerners was one of friendship. The crusaders, proceeding under the papal

banner, had sufficient means to pay their way and they resorted to foraging only when they were refused markets where they could buy their food. In Byzantine territory, as a rule, regular arrangements were made for markets and imperial officials took charge of the provisioning of the armies.⁵

Upon arrival in Constantinople, the cooperation between the papal forces and the emperor continued. The pope most certainly expected that Alexius would welcome the crusaders, otherwise he would not have selected Constantinople as the mobilization point for his armies. And there was every reason for Alexius to cooperate. Even though he had asked for mercenary troops and not for independent military forces, the emperor had to face the harsh reality that he must have the aid of the westerners if he were to regain any of the lands recently lost to the Turks. The crusaders might be troublesome to handle, but they had come to help him. They apparently had no intention of taking any of his territory, for the expedition was on its way to Jerusalem, and to get there it had to fight the Turks.

It is true that Alexius made one last attempt to make mercenaries out of the crusaders. Despite his agreement with the pope, the emperor wished to make certain of the individual crusading leaders, for they would be operating in territory formerly Byzantine. As each leader arrived in Constantinople, therefore, Alexius negotiated with him separately, and obtained from each an oath of homage and fealty, as a sign of vassalage to the Byzantine Empire.⁶ There was but one exception; Raymond of Toulouse objected to this implication of vassalage and bluntly told Alexius that "he had not come hither to make another his lord or to fight for any other than the One for whom he had left his country and possessions."⁷ Raymond was willing to cooperate with the emperor as an ally, he swore to respect the life and honor of the emperor, but he refused to take the oath of homage which would make him a vassal.⁸ The hardy Provençal was in an influential position, for he had been the first leader to take up the cross and in his army traveled the pope's personal legate and spiritual leader of the crusade, Bishop Adhemar of Puy. Thus Raymond was merely carrying out the papal plan for the crusade, and his blunt refusal induced Alexius to deal with the crusaders as allies, rather than as vassals.

A treaty along these lines was drawn up between the emperor and the crusaders. By it the Westerners prom-

¹ Speech of Urban II at the Council of Clermont, November 26, 1095", in *Urban and the Crusaders* (ed. by D. C. Munro). *Translations and Reprints From the Original Sources of European History* (Philadelphia, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press), I, No. 2, 2-8; Cf. Dana C. Munro, "The Speech of Pope Urban II," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XI (1905-1906), 231-242.

² Frederick Duncalf, "The Pope's Plan For the First Crusade" in *The Crusades and Other Historical Essays, Presented to Dana C. Munro by His Former Students* (ed. by Louis J. Paetow) (New York, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1928), pp. 44-48.

³ August C. Krey, "Urban's Crusade, Success or Failure," *American Historical Review*, Vol. LIII (1947-1948), 235-236.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 236; Cf. Dana C. Munro, "Did the Emperor Alexius Ask for Aid at the Council of Piacenza?", *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXVII (1922), 731.

⁵ Duncalf, "The Pope's Plan for the First Crusade" in *Crusaders and Other Historical Essays*, pp. 46-47.

⁶ August C. Krey, *The First Crusade, The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1921), pp. 78-101.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 98; Cf. *Histoire Anonyme de la Première Croisade*, (ed. and transl. by Louis Brehier) (Paris, 1924), pp. 34-40.

ised to restore to Alexius "whatever lands or cities they captured which had once belonged to the empire, and which were now in the hands of its enemies."⁹ In return, Alexius engaged himself to give military aid to the crusaders on land and sea and eventually to assume command in person of the Greek forces cooperating with the Franks. He promised also to furnish them with markets where they could buy food during their campaign.¹⁰ These terms indicate that the crusaders were now allies of the emperor for the wars against the Turks in Asia Minor, and that both the Greeks and the Franks were to join in fulfilling the pope's objective of recovering the Holy Land. It was mutually recognized that the Westerners needed the emperor and that Alexius needed the crusaders' aid.¹¹

When the crusaders finally left Constantinople to begin their long journey to Jerusalem, they were allied with the Eastern Empire, and the following months showed effective cooperation between the two. Their first objective was Nicaea, the capital city of Asia Minor,¹² which had been a menace to the Eastern Empire since its capture by the Turks. It was due probably to the requests of Alexius rather than to the fact that the capture of the city was necessary to the successful prosecution of the campaign, that the Franks besieged Nicaea. Since the city was located on Lake Nicaea, the crusaders requested (from the emperor and received) a number of vessels, which had to be dragged overland, as well as a division of Greek troops.¹³ The siege lasted for five weeks, but when the crusaders finally stormed the walls, the Turks, fearing the sack of the city, surrendered to the emperor rather than to the Westerners. The crusaders were angered at being deprived of the spoils of the rich city and complained bitterly at what they considered treachery on the part of Alexius.¹⁴ The emperor, however, compensated them with rich gifts and after a week the march continued.¹⁵

The next objective was Antioch, some six hundred miles to the south. A small Greek force under Taticius accompanied the army, but Alexius himself remained behind to complete the reconquest of the northeastern portion of Asia Minor which the conquest of Nicaea had facilitated. The journey toward Antioch became exceedingly difficult because of the lack of water and provisions, and the army split into two divisions to make foraging easier. The division of the army almost

proved disastrous; for at Dorylaeum a large Turkish force swooped down on the Norman contingent, and only the timely arrival of the second segment saved the entire army from annihilation. In the ensuing battle the Turks were routed, and as a result the road to Antioch lay completely open.¹⁶

After the victory some of the ambitious Westerners drew off from the main force in order to make conquests for themselves. The bulk of the army, however, continued towards Antioch, capturing and garrisoning some two hundred castles and towns on the way.¹⁷ On October 20, 1097, an expectant murmur rose up from the ranks as they approached the Orontes River, the last obstacle before the prize immediately ahead; for only eight miles away was Antioch, the key to Syria and the gateway to the promised land. The condition of the army had greatly changed in the long march through Asia Minor. The privations which it had been forced to endure had thinned its ranks; the infantry had fallen by the way in tens of thousands; the cavalry had lost the greater part of its horses. But now before them lay the rich valley with its promise of ample food and drink, and a terrain more familiar to these sons of France, Flanders and southern Italy. Without delay, therefore, the advance guard routed the Turkish defenders of the bridge, and while the army busied itself in dividing the captured Turkish spoils of animals, grain and wine, the Norman leader, Bohemond, pushed ahead with four thousand troops and by evening was encamped before the walls of Antioch. The next day, October 21, 1097, the rest of the army moved forward, and there began the siege of the great city.¹⁸

As the troops deployed before the walls, their eyes gazed with awe at the strength and fortifications of the city. The magnificent fortress had been one of the masterpieces of Byzantine military engineering, and its strength had not been impaired during the twelve years of Turkish occupation. Its strength rested both in its fortifications and in its strategic geographic position. Half of the city lay in the plain which skirted the southern bank of the Orontes River and half on the rugged slopes of the Casian Range. In exposed positions, where the river and the mountains did not offer a natural defense, there was a double wall, wide enough for a chariot to drive over. This huge wall had about four hundred towers, some sixty feet in height, which commanded both the wall and the ground below it. To the north there was an extent of marshy land, wedged in between the Orontes and the walls, which made approach from that direction difficult and hazardous. The immense wall was pierced by five large gates, all of them in the lower part of the city below the hills. In the upper portion of the city, among the hills, were numerous smaller postern gates, through which messengers and spies might be sent out and food brought in. Within the city itself, built as an integral part of the walls, was a powerful citadel, which was unapproachable from

⁹ Ralph Bailey Yewdale, *Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1924), p. 44.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 44; Cf. *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 30-33.

¹¹ Fulcher of Chartres, *Chronicle of the First Crusade* (*Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana*) (trans. by Martha Evelyn McGinty) (Philadelphia, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1941), pp. 28-29: "It was necessary for all to confirm friendship with the Emperor, without whose counsel and aid we could not have completed our journey, nor could those who were to follow us on that same road."

¹² *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 34-35.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41; William of Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea* (transl. by Emily Atwater Babcock and A. C. Krey) (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943), I, 160.

¹⁴ *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 40-41; Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade, Accounts of Eyewitnesses*, p. 104; Letter of Anselm of Ribemont to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims, in *Translations and Reprints*, I, no. 4, p. 3.

¹⁵ "Letter to Stephen, Count of Blois, to his Wife", in Krey, *The First Crusade, Accounts of Eyewitnesses*, p. 109.

¹⁶ Krey, *The First Crusade, Account of Eyewitnesses*, pp. 113-118.

¹⁷ "Letter of Anselm of Ribemont to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims," *Translations and Reprints*, I, no. 4, 2.

¹⁸ *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 66-67.

the lower city except by a single narrow path.

It became quickly obvious to the army leaders that there were not enough men to surround the great circuit of the wall. The small postern gates were, therefore, to remain unguarded, but even to cover the approaches to the front of the city was no easy matter. If the crusaders crossed the Orontes River and pitched their camps on the narrow strip of marshy land, they would be directly beneath the walls with the river at their backs. If they remained on the far side of the river, the Turks would be able to pass freely into the eastern plain, toward Aleppo.

The leaders, therefore, had to decide what tactics to follow. They could either order an all-out attack on the walls, lay siege to the city in order to starve it into submission, or withdraw in the face of the coming winter and await reinforcements from the emperor and from the new army which was reported on its way from France. After a heated debate the leaders decided to besiege the town but not to storm the walls.¹⁹ The camps were moved down to the river and Bohemond with his Norman forces took the left flank before St. Paul's Gate, while the other armies deployed in order before the Dog's Gate and the Duke's Gate. In this arrangement only three of the five principal gates were blockaded, while the two remaining gates permitted the Turks to leave or enter the city as they pleased.²⁰

But even in front of the three besieged gates the crusaders seemed to care little for military operations. The leaders and the knights were more interested in capturing towns and castles in the surrounding country than in pushing the siege. Nor did those who remained in camp care much for siege-work. Life in the fertile valley was too pleasant, especially when compared with the privations of the previous months. Here meat was so plentiful that only choice cuts were eaten, the vines were full of grapes, the pits full of grain, the trees bent down with fruit. This was truly the land flowing with milk and honey.²¹

But it did not take long for the huge multitude to devour the rich abundance of the harvest, and as the cold winds began to blow, food became scarce. Dire want forced the crusaders to rove about in search of food, to forage farther and farther from the armed forces. The Turks, however, began to send out small detachments to harass the roads around the crusading camp, and these wrought frightful havoc among the pillaging groups. The Turkish raiders were aided by groups from another fortress, about three hours east of Antioch, named Harem, and the combined forces took a heavy toll of Christian lives. The Norman leader, Bohemond, assumed the military initiative and leadership in eliminating this menace, and henceforth he is usually recognized as the military leader. With Robert of Flanders and Robert of Normandy Bohemond rode out in the middle of November, and although he was confronted by a force much larger than his own, by

luring them into an ambush, he succeeded in routing the infidels.²²

But although the immediate roads around the camps were cleared, the food situation gradually became more critical. By December the supplies in the district around Antioch had almost been exhausted, and the prices on everything rose greatly. To add to the misery of the Christians, rains drenched them almost daily, chilling them to the bone and rusting their weapons or rotting their bow strings. The rains were followed by excessive cold, which left the crusaders chilled and miserable.²³

The food situation became so critical that the leaders decided to send out a large armed force to search for supplies in the hitherto unravaged Mohammedan country to the East. Again Bohemond commanded the force that entered the Turkish lands, assisted by Robert of Flanders, and for three days the countryside was scoured for whatever food could be found. On the third day the Franks were engaged by a huge Turkish force which was on its way to relieve Antioch. Quick action by Bohemond and Robert of Flanders prevented the Turks from deploying in their usual encircling maneuver, and in the hand-to-hand conflict that followed the Turks were routed.²⁴ It proved to be fortunate for the Crusading army that the relieving Turkish army had been intercepted before it could reach the besieged city, for the Frankish forces before the walls were being attacked by sorties from within the gates and were barely holding their own. Had the relieving army of Turks come up at that time, the depleted army of the Cross might have been overwhelmed by simultaneous attacks from the front and the rear, and the whole crusade might have come to an early end.

After their encounter with the Turkish force, Bohemond and Robert of Flanders continued their quest for supplies, but found that the country had been stripped bare. They returned to Antioch "victorious but empty-handed", and a bleak winter followed.²⁵ The price of food became forbiddingly high and many who could not pay the excessive prices died from hunger. Many sought relief in flight from the camp, with the intention of reaching the coast some fifteen miles away and boarding a vessel for the West. The exodus, which began with the poorest of the pilgrims, soon spread to the more influential members, and only quick action by the leaders in apprehending the deserters prevented wide-scale defections.²⁶

The situation grew worse; men and horses died off like flies. But grave as was the situation among the crusaders, the conditions within Antioch were far more

²² *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 68-71; "Letter of Anselm Ribbemont to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims," *Translations and Reprints*, I, no. 4, 4. Stephen of Blois had actually been chosen as leader during the siege, but the conceited Frenchman was little more than a figurehead. Godfrey de Bouillon and Raymond of Toulouse were sick at the time.

²³ *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 70-71.

²⁴ *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 72-73; Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 135-136.

²⁵ *Histoire Anonyme*, pp. 76-77; Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *First Crusade*, p. 136; Fulcher of Chartres, *Chronicle of the First Crusade*, pp. 44-45.

²⁶ Among those who attempted to flee was Peter the Hermit, but he was apprehended.

¹⁹ Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, p. 125.

²⁰ Yewdale, *Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch*, p. 54.

²¹ Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, p. 127; *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 68-69.

critical. The besieged sent out repeated appeals to neighboring Turkish forces for aid, and a Seljuk emir, Rudwan of Aleppo, responded with an army of twenty to twenty-eight thousand troops, with which he marched toward Antioch early in February, 1098. The news of the approach of this force added to the gloom of the crusaders' camp and forced fresh desertions, the leading one being that of the Byzantine representative, Taticius. He had opposed the strategy of siege from the beginning and had tried to delay military operations around Antioch until the emperor had arrived to participate in the taking of the city. But now that the fortunes of the Christians seemed to be without hope, Taticius departed from the camp on the excuse that he would prepare food ships to relieve the distress of the army and that he would hasten the march of the imperial army. He left his tents and his troops before Antioch as a pledge that he would return, but most of the western chroniclers are in agreement that the imperial representative was cowardly and faithless.²⁷

The departure of Taticius emphasized the seriousness of the situation. But instead of awaiting the arrival of the Turkish force, the leaders decided to intercept the approaching army at a place about eight miles from Antioch where the lake of Begras and the river Orontes formed a defile through which the army had to pass. In this place the Turkish methods of fighting—rapid outflanking and encirclement of the enemy—could not be employed, and their superior numbers could not avail. Bohemond, who suggested the plan, was selected as leader, and although he could muster only seven hundred mounted men, he led this small force under cover of darkness to the defile and deployed it in six lines. When the Turks advanced along the road to the place of ambush, the vanguard was thrown back upon the main body, and the Turkish force, unable to spread out because of the water on either side, broke in flight. By nightfall the crusaders made their way back to camp with the enemy's baggage in their hands and the danger ended.²⁸

The captured supplies relieved the food crisis, and with the coming of March and warmer weather the crusaders began to make more serious plans for accelerating the military operations against the city. The leaders decided to seal off the two remaining gates through which the Turks had been passing throughout the winter and towards this end proposed the building of a fortress opposite the north gate. Since there were no tools or material for the construction of the fortification in camp, Raymond and Bohemond volunteered to obtain the supplies at the Port of Saint Simeon, twelve miles distant, from Genoese and English ships in the harbor. But as soon as the two chieftains had departed, the commander of Antioch began attacking the camp with such success that he determined upon a bold

scheme of intercepting the returning army from Saint Simeon and of destroying it. His troops fell on the unsuspecting soldiers, laden down with heavy supplies, and forced them to flee in the greatest disorder. Emboldened by his triumphs, the emir, Yagi Sian, ordered all his men out of the city to fight against the Christians and closed the gates behind them. They were either to conquer or to die. But the Christians rallied their forces and counter-attacked before the Turks could fan out in their usual crescent-shaped formation, and in the hand-to-hand fighting that followed the attackers were driven back to the city, whose gates the disillusioned emir was forced to reopen.²⁹

Having overcome this danger, the crusaders hastened to construct their fortress in the north and closed that gate to the Turks. Tancred, the brother of Bohemond, volunteered to garrison the fifth gate to the south, and by the end of March all the five principal gates of the city were blockaded by the Franks.³⁰ The Turks dared no longer to go out for fodder, wood or other necessities, and their situation deteriorated rapidly. In despair they again sent out frantic appeals to the neighboring Seljuks, but no aid was immediately forthcoming. As the weeks passed, a large part of the population began to grumble that it was ready to surrender. One of the defenders of the city named Piruz, who commanded three towers along the walls, went so far as to open negotiations with Bohemond with a view to betraying the city into the hands of the Christians in return for a liberal reward.³¹

When Bohemond had completed his secret negotiations with Piruz for the betrayal of the city, he made his first open bid to acquire title to Antioch. He did not come forth openly, but at a meeting of the military chieftains held early in May, 1098, he made the proposal that the city should be granted to the man who would succeed in taking it.³² The other leaders flatly turned down the proposal on the basis that all had fought equally in the siege and all should share in the rewards.³³

But circumstances played into Bohemond's hands. In reply to the frantic appeals from Antioch a great Turkish leader, Kerbogha of Mosul, had gathered a great army of 150,000 men and towards the end of May was on his way to relieve the city. This force was too large to intercept, and to await its arrival passively would mean being crushed before the walls of the city. A speedy decision was necessary as to the course of action to follow, and in desperation the leaders reversed themselves in favor of Bohemond's plan. They decided that the city should be handed over to him if he succeeded in capturing it; but even in this desperate situation they remembered their oath to Alexius, for they made the grant to the Norman leader conditional: "if the Emperor comes to our aid and wishes to carry

²⁷ *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 79-81; Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 140-141.

²⁸ Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages* (Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923), p. 280; *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 82-87; Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 141-142.

²⁹ Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 147-149; *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 92-97; Oman, *History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, p. 281.

³⁰ *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 98-99; Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 150-151.

³¹ There is much controversy as to the nationality of Piruz, for the chronicles disagree. Some call him a Turk, while others list him as a Christian Armenian. Cf. Yewdale, *Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch*, p. 65.

³² *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 100-103.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

out every agreement, as he swore and promised, we will return it to him by right. But if he does not do this, let Bohemond keep it in his power."³⁴

Having obtained the promise, Bohemond communicated with Piruz and from May 29 to June 2, 1098, they planned their strategy. Piruz suggested that on the night of June 2, the Franks, in order not to arouse the suspicion of the garrison, should pretend to start out as if for an expedition into Saracen country, then they should encircle the city in the dark and come to the portion of the wall which he guarded. On the night designated, as Kerbogha's army was only a short distance away, Bohemond put this plan into execution. Only the top leaders, Godfrey de Bouillon, Robert of Flanders, Raymond of Toulouse and Bishop Adhemar, were briefed on the actual situation; the rest of the army was told to prepare for an expedition into Saracen territory. To those not acquainted with the secret plan the situation seemed hopeless on account of the approach of the overwhelmingly superior relieving army and many deserted, among them Stephen of Blois, who had originally been chosen as the leader of the entire army for the siege.³⁵

After feigning a march to the east and south, the army encircled the city, and shortly before daybreak it arrived at the towers commanded by Piruz. When Piruz gave the signal, the crusaders began to mount the rope ladder which had been dropped from the battlement. After about sixty men, including Bohemond, had ascended and had begun seizing the towers, the whole scheme almost went awry, for the rope ladder broke under the weight of ascending men and the small group atop the walls was isolated. Desperately the crusaders on the outside searched for another entrance; by luck they found a small unguarded postern gate which they immediately broke down to gain entry. All of Antioch was soon in an uproar, and the tumult attracted the attention of those who had remained in the camp. When these saw the banner of Bohemond flying over the city, they rushed into the fight, and before long the city was in the hands of the Christians.³⁶ Only the heavily fortified citadel rising above the town remained in the possession of the Turks.

But the capture of the city did not alter much the desperate position of the crusaders. In fact the men of the Cross now faced a more critical situation than before. On the day after the city passed into Christian hands, the van of Kerbogha's army appeared and began encircling the walls. By the eighth of June the siege around the Christians was complete, and the crusaders found themselves under attack both from the Turks on the outside and by those in the citadel within the city. Shut in within the gates, the crusaders again suffered from hunger, and discouragement again permeated the camp. Bohemond desperately tried to stop the raids

from the citadel and employed desperate means to get the crusaders to fight.³⁷ The Christians, weak and dispirited from lack of food and the almost incessant attacks of the enemy, had one last forlorn hope—the appearance of their ally, Alexius, with his imperial army. Indeed the emperor had set out with a Greek and Frankish army to join the crusaders at Antioch, to fulfill his agreement, but unknown to the defenders of Antioch, Alexius had been met on the way by Stephen of Blois and other deserters who informed him that the situation was hopeless. They counselled Alexius to turn back, for Kerbogha had probably taken Antioch and might be on his way to ambush the imperial army. The alarmed emperor ordered the land to be devastated in advance of the infidel army and turned with his forces toward Constantinople.³⁸

When the expected relief failed to arrive, the crusaders grew desperate. In the midst of their gloom, however, there appeared what seemed to be a sign from God. A peasant in the army of Raymond of Toulouse, Peter Bartholomew, reported that St. Andrew had appeared to him five times and had directed him to unearth the Holy Lance, which had pierced the side of Christ, from its burial place in the Church of St. Peter in the city. The Holy Lance, according to St. Andrew, would bring victory to the crusaders.³⁹ There was much skepticism among the military leaders, and even Bishop Adhemar seemed doubtful; but Raymond of Toulouse seems to have accepted the story wholeheartedly. The peasant indeed went to the designated church and, after digging, produced the lance which was accepted by most of the army as the Holy Lance.

The finding of the Lance buoyed up the spirits of the entire army, and the leaders decided to utilize this heightened morale to surprise the enemy by a bold attack. The chieftains were careful to anchor their two flanks on natural obstacles, in this case the hills and the river, so that the Turks could not use their tactics of encirclement. After the Christians had formed their lines outside the walls, they engaged the Turks in a frontal attack, and as usual by these tactics they overwhelmingly defeated the vastly superior army of Kerbogha.⁴⁰ As a result the siege was raised, the Turkish garrison in the citadel surrendered, and the crusading army was henceforth safe from further attacks from the Turks of northern Syria.

The route to Jerusalem now lay open, but the armies tarried around Antioch for months. The delay was due partly to the need for recuperation after the difficult nine months of siege, but it was caused mainly by the rivalry among the leaders as to the possession of the city. Although the city had been promised to Bohemond, the other leaders remembered their prior agreement with Alexius. And although Bohemond demurred, immediately after the victory, two legates were

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

³⁵ Fulcher of Chartres, *Chronicle of the First Crusade*, p. 47.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48; *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 104-111; Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 153-155.

³⁷ Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, p. 173; *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 126-137; John C. Andressohn, *The Ancestry and Life of Godfrey of Bouillon* (Bloomington, Indiana University, 1947), p. 82-83.

³⁸ *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 140-147.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-151; Raymond, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 176-180.

⁴⁰ Oman, *History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, pp. 282-288; Fulcher of Chartres, *Chronicle of the First Crusade*, pp. 50-55; *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 147-161; Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 185-189.

sent to Constantinople requesting Alexius to come to receive Antioch as well as to fulfill the promise of personal participation in the war with the Turks.⁴¹ Thus the papal idea of cooperation between the Greeks and the Latins was being continued.

However, when no answer was forthcoming from Constantinople, the dispute over the city became more pronounced; the main claimants to the city were Bohemond and Raymond of Toulouse. The situation became so tense that the whole expedition was threatened with disruption. To add to the confusion Adhemar of Puy, the only man who might have restored order, died.⁴² As the months dragged on and the rank and file impatiently demanded that the order be given to march to Jerusalem, the leaders forced a truce between Bohemond and Raymond. The question of the disposition of the city was to be left in abeyance, and both leaders were to accompany the expedition to Jerusalem. With this settled, on November 23 the armies left Antioch for Jerusalem. But after the capture of Marra on December 11, the old conflict broke out anew, and Bohemond returned to Antioch. He ejected the Provençal troops by force from their towers and remained now the absolute master of the city.

In the spring of 1099 envoys of Alexius arrived at Antioch with an answer to the message which the crusaders had dispatched immediately after the capture of the city. The envoys demanded that Bohemond should restore Antioch to the Byzantine Empire in accordance with the oath which he had taken at Constantinople. The Norman refused because, he said, the Greeks had broken the agreement: first, when Taticius had deserted the army in the hour of need, and secondly because Alexius had not aided the crusaders with an army as he had promised.⁴³ Thus rebuffed, the Greek legates left Antioch and hastened after the crusading army. When they caught up with it at Arka, early in April, they complained to the leaders about Bohemond's violation of the oath and urged the leaders to await the coming of Alexius before proceeding further toward Jerusalem. Although Raymond of Toulouse argued in favor of the delay, the remainder of the chieftains declared that the emperor had already proved himself faithless and that they no longer had any need of imperial assistance. They voted in favor of an immediate march to Jerusalem and against the request of the Byzantine legates.⁴⁴

Thus, by the summer of 1099 the pope's plan of cooperation between the Byzantine Empire and the army seemed entirely negated. Alexius was angered by his failure to obtain Antioch by diplomacy, and he now reverted to force. The army which his legates had announced as being prepared for the march to Jerusalem, was diverted into an attack on the principality of Antioch. Engaged in a war with Bohemond, the emperor was hardly in a mood to cooperate in any plan looking toward the unity between the two churches.

The pope himself must have been saddened by the

turn of events. He had labored incessantly since 1095 to foster cooperation between East and West as a prelude to the unity of the churches. In October, 1098, he had gone so far as to call a church council at Bari to consider the union of the Greek and Latin churches. After some preliminary work the council was adjourned to meet again in Rome the following spring for further deliberations.⁴⁵

But by the spring of 1099 circumstances had changed. The pope's legate, Adhemar of Puy, had died, and Bohemond's demands for Antioch were upsetting the entire plan. Adhemar, prior to his death, had consistently acted as an agent of the pope's plan of re-union. Thus, in every newly-conquered city, whenever a Greek prelate was available, he was reinstated by Adhemar. When the bishop appealed to the West for reinforcements, he did so in conjunction with the Greek patriarch of Jerusalem, then a refugee in Cyprus; the salutation of the letter reads: "The Patriarch of Jerusalem and the bishops, Greek as well as Latin, and the whole army of God and the Church to the Church of the West",⁴⁶ thus indicating an acceptance by both clergies of the unity of the Church. When Antioch had finally been captured, Adhemar arranged for the ceremonial restoration of the Greek patriarch.⁴⁷ Consistently, therefore, both the pope and his legate had acted as if the union of the two churches had already taken place as a result of the cooperation between the Latins and the emperor.

But after the death of Adhemar, due mainly to Bohemond's ambitions concerning Antioch, the promised re-union failed to materialize. The first word of the negation of his efforts came in a letter sent to the pope on September 11, 1098, in the name of the crusading chieftains, but which was edited or supplemented by Bohemond when most of the other leaders were absent from Antioch. In the letter the pope was invited to come in person to Antioch and take charge of the expedition. Writing in the first person, Bohemond assured the pope that he was quite competent to cope with the infidels, but that the pope's help was needed to eradicate these heretics. In a postscript, apparently unseen by the other leaders, Bohemond asked the pope to release his sons from their oaths to the unjust emperor who had promised much and had done so little.⁴⁸ This letter, calling the Greeks heretics, was a portent of how the crusading plans were being perverted by the ambitions of Bohemond. The pope had considered the schism ended; now Bohemond was widening the gap between the Christians of the West and those of the East. The pope must have been extremely discouraged by what had transpired, for when the council met in Rome in 1099, the matter of re-union, which was supposed to have been the main point on the agenda, was not even brought up.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Krey, "Urban's Crusade, Success or Failure," in *American Historical Review*, Vol. LIII (1947-1948), p. 239.

⁴⁶ Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 142-143.

⁴⁷ William of Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, Vol. I, p. 297.

⁴⁸ Duncalf, "The Pope's Plan for the First Crusade," in *Crusades and Other Historical Essays*, p. 54.

⁴⁹ Krey, "Urban's Crusade, Success or Failure," *American Historical Review*, LIII (1947-1948), 241.

⁴¹ *Histoire Anonyme* (ed. Brehier), pp. 160-161.

⁴² Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, p. 198.

⁴³ Yewdale, *Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch*, pp. 77-78.

⁴⁴ Raymond of Agiles, *Chronicle*, in Krey, *The First Crusade*, pp. 234-235.

In retrospect, therefore, the importance of the siege and capture of Antioch stands sufficiently clear. Militarily it was a very successful phase of the crusade, for it saw the defeat of various Turkish armies, and the capture of the city removed the last major obstacle before Jerusalem. Politically Antioch proved a stumbling-block in the relations between the Eastern Empire and the crusading armies, for it augmented the mutual suspicions and antagonisms traditionally in existence. Had the East and West been able to cooperate at this juncture in the crusade, as they had done earlier, the Holy Land would not have subsequently been lost, and the growing hatred which was to see its climax in the capture of Constantinople in the Fourth Crusade would have been avoided. Similarly significant were the religious effects of the Antioch matter. The pope's plan for a re-union of the churches had been based upon political cooperation; when the latter broke down, the papal hopes also collapsed. The attempts to heal that schism which was as yet only in its infancy did not encounter much opposition from the eastern clergy, as is seen from the mutual aid rendered to and by the crusaders in the East. But once the friction arose over Antioch, all hopes of re-union ended. The suspicion and the hatred grew until both sides drifted too far apart for any future understanding. The schism was never healed and has remained down to our own day.

New Atlantis

(Continued from page seventy-six)

Europeans could never quite reconcile themselves to the idea that God had translated the empire from the Romans and Byzantine Greeks to the Germans as to a new chosen people. Experience with the Empire gradually proved to the Catholic Church that while it must ever aim at the spiritual harmony of mankind, a unified political system might not always be to its advantage. Actually the spirit of Christian society had generated freedom which in Europe, the seedbed of Western humanity, more or less naturally expressed itself in political and cultural diversity. The Church to some degree but more especially the circumstances of the times began to encourage the centrifugal forces which were struggling for dominance in the middle of the thirteenth century. The result was the rise of the national state and the eclipse of the Holy Roman Empire. Europe shed the political form of the theocratic empire and became a community of free states.

The rise of humanism and of the Protestant Revolt completed the transformation. The spiritual unity of Christendom was rent asunder and the formula of *cuius regio eius religio* consummated the division by making religion the servant of the national state. Jean Bodin expressed this profound transformation best when he attributed to the national monarch the very prerogative which Dante accorded to the universal emperor. Deep in European consciousness, however, the idea prevailed that something vital had been lost, and great minds began to look for substitutes for medieval unity. In the early sixteenth century Francisco de Vitoria, recognizing the plurality of sovereign states, developed the medieval schoolmen's doctrine of *ius gentium* into the

modern *corpus* of international law. Unfortunately de Vitoria—like Woodrow Wilson after him—was unable to find a central authority capable of distinguishing between "just" and "unjust" war or of enforcing its decisions. Accordingly a second and more pragmatic substitute for medieval unity arose in the principle of the balance of power which was recognized at Westphalia (1648) and more solemnly at Utrecht (1713) as the *justo potentiae equilibrio* "to confirm and stabilize the peace and tranquillity of the Christian world."

The principle of the balance of power was the foundation of the public law of Europe until 1919, and in a way until 1939. In the minds of jurists it is still regarded as a universal principle of liberty, but in practice never from its inception has it satisfactorily solved not merely the question of war and peace but the allied and implicated problems of commercial expansion and demographical growth and pressure.

It is then no wonder that great minds have never lost sight of the ideal of medieval unity. Despite the protestant upheaval and the international anarchy created by the exaggerated modern national state, the sense of membership in a political Christian civilization remained general until the eighteenth century. In 1751 Voltaire described Europe outside Russia as a "great Republic" divided into several different states "but all in harmony with each other, all having the same substratum of religion, although divided into various sects, all possessing the same principles of public and political law, unknown in other parts of the world." In this statement one can discern the universal rather than the particular, the compass of the whole of Christendom, semi-secularized indeed, but nevertheless Western Christendom. In fact long before Voltaire's reflections, other Frenchmen had devised grand designs for European unity. In 1307 Pierre Dubois had drafted a scheme for uniting the Christian nations under the King of France. War between member states was to be outlawed, the league was to present a united front against Islam and was to be governed by a council composed of the heads of states. An international court of arbitration with power to enforce military, economic, and religious decisions was to be set up, and the Pope, shorn of temporal power, as the spiritual arbiter of Christendom was to act as the final court of appeal.

In 1598 as the European balance entered a delicate phase, Henry IV of France and Sully, his chief minister, adopted the scheme of Dubois and planned to embody it in a new European system. The king envisaged the disruption of the Spanish-Austrian imperial power which under Phillip II had aimed at universal power through conquest under the banner of restoring the "seamless garment of Jesus Christ." Europe was then to be constituted in fifteen equal dominions integrated in a permanent league. The component states, hereditary and elective monarchies and republics, were to be constitutionalized into a "Christian Republic." Russia was to be excluded as "barbaric" and "Asiatic" and Turkey as non-Christian. War was to be outlawed,

⁸ Peter Berger. "National Sovereignty and World Unity," *Thought*, XX (1945), 608-9.

except against the Turks or "other external enemies." The overall policy of the league was to be regulated by a supreme council guided by six regional councils representing the states. The supreme council composed of delegates from all the states was to remain in permanent session with an international army to maintain peace and the balance of power.

An assassin's dagger ended the "grand design" of Henry IV, but towards the end of the eighteenth century the Abbé de Saint Pierre, a radical French *philosophe*, revived and expanded it to include Russia, retaining such terms as "Christian Republic." The Abbé's *projet* called for a permanent European league of nations based upon the *status quo* of the Treaty of Utrecht. The super-council of the league was to command an international army and have power to enforce submission to its collective will. War within the league was to be outlawed, and a compulsory international court of arbitration was to be constituted to that end. Frontiers were to be sacrosanct and the super-council was to have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of states.

The Abbé's scheme was ridiculed by Voltaire, who believed that the organization of international peace would have to await the rule of pacific philosopher kings. Rousseau dismissed the philosopher kings as nonsensical but rejected the *projet* on the ground that war was an essential part of the diplomacy of existing kings and that the "Christian Republic" was a "term of derision ironically to express their mutual enmity." Realization of the Abbé's plan would depend upon a European revolution which might replace the monarchies by republics. An international union could then be formed by horizontalizing the Social Contract theory. The Abbé's statesmanlike vision of Europe was thus rejected as optimistic while far more irenist philosophers speculated on a republic of virtue based on reason, or in Rousseau's case on feeling and what he called natural law, in which man would free himself from "revealed superstitions" and "irrationalities" and build up a brave new world of liberty, equality, and fraternity, followed by a millennium of peace and progress.⁴

Less optimistic, but perhaps even more speculative, was Immanuel Kant's *Eternal Peace*. Kant acclaimed Rousseau the Newton of the moral universe because of his substitution of "nature, the artificer of things" for God, and of emotion for reason. The French Revolution seemed to him to mirror man's higher moral purpose. From the standpoint of practical reason he unequivocally rejected war as incompatible with the nature of man, yet undertook to show that it was a *hidden plan of nature* to impel man by the categorical imperative to the establishment of a universal rule of freedom under law. War was the penalty for the moral depravity of man, who refused to do the right thing freely and therefore must be compelled by nature. In his conditions of *Eternal Peace* he required that states should first adopt republican constitutions (i. e., constitutions based on the consent of the governed), then such "free states" should federate round the republic of "a powerful and enlightened people." In this statement

Kant seemingly forecast the eventual role of the United States. Finally Kant's plan called for a law of world citizenship in which imperialism and conquest would be incompatible. He anticipated the law of the indivisibility of war and peace, denounced the right of intervention, and demanded that no treaty contain the material of a future war.⁵

Napoleon, no less than Charlemagne, envisioned a Europe united by conquest and the supremacy of law under the hegemony of one European power. His vision passed, but at the Congress of Vienna (1814) Alexander I of Russia sought to revive a peculiarly Russian measure of European unity. Historians generally denounce the Holy Alliance, some as the transparent soul of a non-existent body, others as the negation of international law. Yet at Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) Alexander's "general guarantee" which involved the right to intervene in the internal affairs of states was incorporated into the terms of the European Concert, and at the Conference of Verona, France was assigned the task of suppressing revolution in Spain, which of course carried with it the right to restore the Spanish power in South America. England, which had never really endorsed the Holy Alliance, bolted from the Concert, and shortly thereafter the United States Government declared the Monroe Doctrine.⁶

Mazzini, Nietzsche, and Napoleon III were the last Europeans of the nineteenth century to dream of a united Europe. Bismarck acknowledged as his philosopher Spinoza, whose central tenet is that "the big fishes devour the little fishes by natural right."

But there are genuine Europeans in the twentieth century who have never despaired of resurrecting European unity in a federation of democratic states. Such a one is Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. In the Covenant of the League there was a brief allusion to regional understandings. This clause supplied Count Coudenhove-Kalergi with the basis of his Pan-Europe movement. Europe, as he saw it, was not a continent but a cultural region of the Old World. In 1923 he wrote *Pan-Europe* and sent copies to leading Europeans. Within a very short time, Pan-Europe had become a program supported by Ignaz Seipel, Edward Benes, Edouard Herriot, Aristide Briand, Benedetto Croce, Gustav Stresemann, Winston Churchill, Nicholas Murray Butler, and a host of other influential statesmen, scholars, and industrialists. On October 3, 1926, the first Pan-European congress opened in Vienna. In 1927 Aristide Briand agreed to sponsor a plan for a United States of Europe at Geneva despite the opposition of the British Government, which regarded the idea as impractical, dangerous to British imperial links, and likely to lead to a French or German hegemony in Europe.

On September 4, 1929, Briand, in an eloquent address to the League advocated European union as the only solution of the chaotic state of European economics and of collective security. He was strongly supported by Stresemann, and the governments of Europe agreed

⁵ C. J. Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 31, 45-7, 55.

⁶ E. Nys, *Études de droit international et politique*. (Brussels: 1896), *passim*.

⁴ Ross Hoffman, *The Great Republic*. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), pp. 17-33.

to discuss officially the proposal in the hope of bringing nearer realization at the next session of the League. Before that time Stresemann had died and demagogic nationalism had scored a tremendous triumph in Germany. In the Reichstag elections of 1930 the Nazi Party captured 107 seats, becoming the second largest party in parliament. Briand fell from grace, having worsened Franco-British relations and having excited the apprehensions of the Soviet Union.⁷

Hitler had his own plans for Pan-Europe, but they were *Gleichberechtigung* and *Grossraumwirtschaft*, and it was left to Winston Churchill to revive Briand's founding aim. In 1940 this modern Cato offered dedicated France the nucleus of Pan-Europe in his proposal for an Anglo-British Union. Again in 1943 he demanded a Council of Europe within the framework of world organization. He laid his finger on the essential difficulty to such a Council—the great and small states of Europe—and offered as a solution groupings of small states into confederations, the whole making a Council of great states and groups of states. In 1947 he assured Russia that European union was no "sinister plot against the Soviet." The remark was as timely as it was true. The need of a United Europe antedates not merely the Soviet but even the existence of Russia as a state and the contemporary effort has an anti-Soviet complexion only because of the gigantic struggle of the Soviet to submerge Western civilization with its heritage of freedoms, values, and laws in a union of slavery. Another point of singular importance which Mr. Churchill stressed was the German question. Without Germany there can be no United States of Europe, but German inclusion can come about as a result of a new deal between France and Germany.⁸

Heretofore the greatest obstacle to European union has been the exaggerated nationalism of the great linguistic units of Western Europe. But there is in Europe genuine democratic federation of sections of three great European nationalities into the higher synthesis of a democratic European union without any violence being done to the national languages, mores, or patriotism of any of the nations involved. Switzerland is a United States of Europe in miniature. Ethnic and linguistic differences are not a serious problem because they are questions not of national prestige but of technical understanding. French and German, Italian and Romansh are equal national tongues used wherever necessary. Each of the twenty-five cantons is a state with its own government, parliament, laws, taxes, traditions, and local patriotism. The Federal Government controls foreign and monetary affairs, external trade and duties, and insures the constitutional rights of the individual and of the canton. Military affairs, transport, and law are partly cantonal, partly federal, while education is cantonal. The federation has assured Switzerland the highest standard of personal liberty and of religious tolerance in Europe and great prosperity in spite of a churlish soil and lack of raw materials or coasts. The Swiss Federation has solved most of Europe's "insoluble" problems.

⁷ R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi. *Crusade for Pan-Europe*. (New York: 1943), pp. 81sqq.

⁸ *The New York Times*, May 18, 1946.

In his May 14 speech at Prince Albert Hall, London, Churchill termed divided Europe "a breeding ground for pestilence and hate," and without a United Europe he saw no prospect for world government. There are millions of people today who are beginning to echo Churchill's words. Owen J. Roberts advocates even a federal union of the United States and United Europe as the only effective reply to the galloping collapse of European economy, depression, and Soviet invasion.

As Alexander Hamilton solved the war-bankruptcy of the thirteen American states in 1789 by Federal Union, a Federal Union of the United States and United Europe might now be created, which could adopt a union currency backed by the combined gold reserves of America and Europe. The new union could take over the national debts of its members, convert their bonds into union bonds, and harness all the immense power thus amalgamated through free enterprise to recovery. The cost should be more than offset by the great economies that union would permit. It might check the cost of living by ending inflationary pressures, shortages, and waste inherent in national sovereignty, restore the foundations of free enterprise, readjust geopolitical conceptions, prevent the coming war, and bring undreamed of prosperity, peace, and freedom. It is certainly a very interesting scheme and, perhaps, no more utopian than federal union seemed in 1788. Just as 1788 was a year of unparalleled crisis for the American way of life, so 1948 is a year of unparalleled crisis for Western civilization; and as union saved the day in 1789, it may again save the day in 1949. At any rate the fact that there are great, brave men today throughout the Western world who are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices in the cause of union recalls the Horatian watchword of the *Pax Romana* that might well inspire our generation in its crusade for the survival of Western civilization.

*Fractus si illabatur mundus
Impavidum inferient ruinae.*

Terms and Ideas

(Continued from page seventy-eight)

from the scene of "enlightened" ideas must be given briefly. In the first place, the failure of Turgot's reform measures (1774-1776) spelled the failure of physiocratic reform theories; for Turgot followed closely most of the ideas on agriculture, freedom of commerce, and general trade practices advocated by the Physiocrats. It seemed that their theories had been tried and had been found wanting.

In the second place, the triumph of Montesquieu's and Rousseau's political theories—first in men's minds and then in the French Revolution—automatically spelled the ruin of physiocratic ideas on government. For the Physiocrats had advocated a benevolent despotism as the ideal government for France, and they had bitterly assailed both Rousseau's *volonté général* and Montesquieu's *contreforces* as conducive to impossibly bad government. After 1789 one who believed in physiocracy was a dangerous reactionary.

Even more disastrous for the Physiocrats was the appearance in 1776 of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, which damned physiocracy with faint praise and presented the world with a caricature of its doctrines. The *Wealth of Nations* became the keyhole through which many nineteenth-century students of economic theory looked at the Physiocrats, and the picture they obtained was not a correct one. Smith's chief mistake lay in analyzing physiocratic economic theories out of the context in which they were set, both the context of physiocratic moral, social, and political theory, and the environmental context of agricultural France.¹⁸ Smith's concept of "political economy" was greatly different from the physiocratic concept of "l'économie politique." So was that of Jean-Baptiste Say, leading French economist of the first decade of the nineteenth century, who thought he was a follower of the Physiocrats but was in reality a disciple of Smith. Du Pont's letter of criticism to Say in 1815 shows how Smith and Say differed from the Physiocrats.

How have you failed to see that all the science and all the morality of economics was there [in physiocracy]? How have you attempted to split this science in two in order to separate that of wealth, which is only a collection of calculations, from that of the developments appropriate for showing the utility of conforming to the law? The latter was, always has been, and always will be everything within the realm of justice, which cannot be violated without injustice, without tyranny, without crime. . . .

You see, my dear Say, that our science is very extensive, that it embraces a great number of objects. Why do you restrain yourself to that of wealth? Take account; walk in the country; everything you see there moves according to the will of the Creator, according to each species. Your genius is vast; do not imprison it in the ideas and the language of the English, a sordid people who believe that man wishes only for what he can obtain with money, who call a public thing by the term "commonwealth," as if there were nothing such as morality or justice. . . .¹⁹

The concept of Smith and Say survived, and economics became the science of wealth at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Economists tended to give only a passing nod to the Physiocrats as predecessors of Smith and Say, as men who held a bundle of confused ideas on other subjects, but whose economic concepts served handily to usher in the sounder work of Smith, Say and the classical school.

III

The Physiocrats were resurrected from the oblivion into which Smith and the French Revolution had thrust them, when Eugène Daire published a collection of their writings in 1846. Daire's collection and his commentary did more than any other single thing to misrepresent physiocratic thought for posterity. Daire was an economist. And therein lay the difficulty, for by 1846 economics was limited to the science of wealth, and economists were narrow men who wore blinders to shut out the view of anything outside their narrow province. It is therefore not surprising to find that though Daire claimed that he had selected all the important works of

the Physiocrats and that their other writings were relatively unimportant, nevertheless he failed to include the writings truly basic to an understanding of physiocracy.

He failed, for example, to include the all-important first part of Le Mercier's *L'Ordre naturel* because "it offers only a very confused assemblage of dissertations holding at the same time to the moral order, the political order, and the material interests of society."²⁰ This was the great point of physiocracy, and because Daire did not recognize it, he eliminated it. Of Le Trosne's three important works, as another example, Daire included only the *Intérêt social*, which deals with the author's economic doctrines. His *L'Ordre social*, containing his social and political ideas and presenting his *views d'ensemble*, is his most important work,²¹ but Daire omits it completely. In similar manner did he treat Quesnay and all the others. Their specifically economic writings, what they would consider their derivative thought, he presents as their principal doctrines. Thus their economic theories were wrenched from their setting to be studied in the light of such subsequent theories as those of Smith, Ricardo and McCulloch, Say and Bastiat, instead of in the light of their setting in eighteenth-century France.

Daire's collection and commentary did not pass uncontested. In the *Journal des économistes* Passy attacked Daire for stressing only the economic doctrines of the Physiocrats while slighting their social philosophy,²² and a few years later Baudrillart wrote an article for the same journal in which he tried to show how moral principles were the basis upon which Quesnay and his associates erected their system of economics. But the view held by Daire prevailed, partly because for the rest of the century economists alone showed interest in the Physiocrats, and partly because Daire's collection had all the surface marks of scholarship. It was voluminous, it included primary texts, it abounded with factual information. What to the nineteenth-century scholar could be more conclusive?

Through the rest of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, therefore, economists followed the path set out by Daire. They studied the Physiocrats with the assumption that they were primarily economists in the sense that Bastiat and McCulloch were, and that their other writings could be passed by as trivial. As scholarship broadened somewhat toward the end of the century, more attention was paid to physiocratic writings on natural law. It came to be seen that the Physiocrats thought there was a connection between natural law and their economic theories, and honest scholars were obliged to see what that connection was.

One explanation held that the Physiocrats were economists who used philosophical terminology as window-dressing to sell their ideas in the eighteenth century. "The theories of natural law are a sort of decoration," one supporter of this explanation says, "a mark of the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

²¹ This is the observation of Le Trosne's chief biographer Jerome Mille, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²² H. Passy, "De l'école des physiocrates," *Journal des économistes*, XVII (June, 1847), pp. 229-243.

²³ Henri Baudrillart, "La philosophie des physiocrates," *ibid.* XXIX (May, 1851), 1-17.

¹⁸ Smith made several capital mistakes in his analysis of physiocracy. He did not understand what the Physiocrats meant by *stérile*; he thought that they held for perfect liberty and perfect equality, though they specifically show that neither is possible nor desirable; in what purports to be an adequate examination of physiocracy, he makes no mention of the *impôt unique*, a cardinal point of physiocratic theory. This, and a mass of other evidence, inclines the author to believe that Smith's connections with the Physiocrats were most casual and his knowledge of their thought quite superficial.

¹⁹ "Correspondance de Du Pont de Nemours avec J.-B. Say," in Eugene Daire (ed.), *Physiocrates*, pp. 396, 415.

pirit of the century. . . They do not express the intimate substance of his [Quesnay's] thought; they are not the source of the substance of his doctrine."²⁴

The explanation most generally offered, however, is that the philosophical principles of the Physiocrats are a kind of rationalization made to support their economic doctrines. Thus Erich Roll sees these principles as "the logical development of their economic ideas,"²⁵ and Mario Einaudi believes that all physiocratic doctrine flows from Quesnay's *Tableau économique*, "the key which opens the door to a correct interpretation of the whole."²⁶ Georges Weulersse, outstanding modern authority on the Physiocrats, claims that "the philosophical, social and political principles that the Physiocrats proclaim . . . are only a secondary development from the primitive body of their doctrine [which is economic theory]."²⁷

A third group held that physiocratic philosophy was simply the rationalist philosophy of the Enlightenment. This is the explanation of such men as Harry Elmer Barnes,²⁸ August Bock,²⁹ Othmar Spann,³⁰ and Walter L. Dorn.³¹ The chief defect of this explanation is that while it seems to satisfy fairly well for such an author as Le Mercier, it fails completely to account for much of Quesnay's and Mirabeau's theorizing on such things as fair price, natural rights, the nature of exchange, and the distinction between commerce and traffic in goods.

This failure to understand Quesnay when he writes of moral and philosophical subjects is due to the nineteenth century's having become enamored with the positivistic method in economics and to its having narrowed the concept of economics to the science of wealth. The tendency all through the century was to do as Albert Meyers advised his students to do and "forget the old phrase 'natural rights.'" This phrase is really an unfortunate heritage from a pre-revolutionary school of French philosophers who contributed much that was otherwise valuable in early economic writings."³²

Such a desire to cut economic theory—and therefore the Physiocrats—off from the past seems due to the fact that the nineteenth-century mind did not understand and therefore despised the past. Daire, for example, shows this ignorance in asserting that before Quesnay no one had ever known the concept of distributive justice, that in medieval times such ideas as those of justice and natural rights were obscure and vague.³³ Thorstein Veblen, one of the century's better theoretical economists, sought to analyze the physiocratic idea of

natural law, "a very simple matter,"³⁴ by showing how for the Physiocrats this meant a propensity or a tendency, the same thing as the "law" of supply and demand to the later classical economists. Pierre Struvé unwittingly revealed his own and many of his contemporaries' ignorance of what the Physiocrats were trying to say when he observed: "The fundamental contradiction of this conception [the physiocratic concept of natural law] is evident. It is the primitive confusion of the idea of natural law with that of moral law. [!]"³⁵

One must conclude that later economists could undertake the study of such writers as Le Mercier and Le Trosne sympathetically. These were men of the "High Enlightenment," if we may transpose a Renaissance term, who made sense to rationalist nineteenth-century scholars. Injustice was done to them chiefly by eliminating their basic theories as unessential and thus leaving their economic conclusions orphan doctrines to be adopted, with only a new suit of clothes, into the family of classical economic theory.

But one must also conclude that nineteenth-century economists could not understand the two older members of the physiocratic school, Quesnay and Mirabeau. The latter they could ignore, but Quesnay had to be reckoned with as founder and father of the school. Physiocratic theories were originally his theories. So the old Doctor's thoughts were screened through his "enlightened" students' interpretations, and then reinterpreted for posterity by historians of economic thought. The result was more a caricature than a photograph of what Quesnay had in mind as he wrote his articles and talked with his followers. His language and his ideas remained out of grasp for the nineteenth-century mind; for Quesnay was of the pre-enlightened eighteenth century, whereas his followers were not. The "enlightened" journalist Grimm indicates how unenlightened and old-fashioned Quesnay seemed to the age when he observes of the Doctor that "he is not only naturally obscure, he is even systematically obscure and he pretends that truth should never be stated clearly."³⁶ Le Mercier, on the other hand, had endeared himself to "enlightened" persons by filling his book with such phrases as *évident, toujours et nécessairement, avec certitude*.

IV

Observation of how a theory came to be misinterpreted in this one instance cannot justify our coming to definite conclusions on how theories change meaning through the years. But it can suggest a few considerations. It suggests, in the first place, that historians treat ideas in history pretty much as the memory handles recollections of an event. Psychological tests show that if an event is recalled a number of times, the final recollection of the event is likely to have faint resemblance to the first. So it is with a body of theory explained and analyzed time and time again through the years. The picture of physiocracy recently given by Charles Bourthoumieux or J. A. Mourant bears considerably less re-

²⁴ H. Truchy, "Le libéralisme économique de Quesnay," *Revue de l'économie politique*, XIII (1900), p. 927.

²⁵ *A History of Economic Thought* (New York, 1940), p. 30.

²⁶ *The Physiocratic Doctrine of Judicial Control* (Cambridge, 1938), p. 10.

²⁷ Weulersse, *op. cit.*, II, 683.

²⁸ *An Economic History of the Western World* (New York, 1937), p. 419.

²⁹ *Der "Produit Net" der Physiokraten* (Berlin, 1921), p. 11.

³⁰ *Types of Economic Theory* (London, 1930), p. 87.

³¹ *Competition for Empire 1740-1763* (New York, 1940), p. 227.

³² *Modern Economic Problems* (New York, 1941), p. 5.

³³ "Mémoire du M. Eugène Daire sur la doctrine des physiocrates," *Journal des économistes*, XVIII (1847), 137.

³⁴ "The Preconceptions of Economic Science," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XIII (1899), 126.

³⁵ "L'Idée de loi naturelle dans la science économique," *Revue de l'économie politique*, XXXV (1921), 298.

³⁶ Grimm, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

semblance to the real thing than that given a century ago by Henri Baudrillart. A great deal has intervened in the last century to confuse our collective memory of an eighteenth-century body of thought.

This is the great difficulty. Historians too often read a body of thought in the light of subsequent events rather than in the light of its own setting. They too often put into men of the past the intention of creating what comes to pass, endowing them with a purposiveness which they did not possess. Thus one author observes that "the physiocratic system may be viewed as having a mission to perform in the development of the economic thought of the world."³⁷ So historians of economic theory pay attention in physiocracy only to what is pertinent to subsequent economic thought, which, as economic conditions continue to change, gives a more and more distorted picture of physiocracy.

Another difficulty is that in an increasingly specialized world various authors have snatched up one or another of the physiocratic doctrines, pulled it out of context, and implied or stated expressly that it was the central truth of physiocracy. Louis Blanc, for example, credited the Physiocrats with having had an incalculable effect in promoting the French Revolution, but he charged them with being proponents of bourgeois liberalism rather than of fraternity and of socialism.³⁸ For him, they were primarily revolutionists. Proudhon considered them "our first economists, the venerable Physiocrats, whose theory of taxation on ground rent has the honor of being the first utopia proposed in over a century."³⁹ For him, they offer a basic socialist doctrine. Henry George dedicated his *Protection and Free Trade* to "those illustrious Frenchmen . . . who, in the night

of despotism, foresaw the glories of the coming day." For him, they were first of all "single-taxers." It is easy to understand how each author's vocation gave him a different view of physiocracy. With each of them it had a different "mission to perform."

Historians must leave to God the decision about missionary activity of various ideas—unless there is historical evidence, of course, of God's having attested such a mission with miracles—and try simply to find what was said, what was meant by the words used, and what happened as a result of the theories enunciated. This means getting back to more than the original documents, the "primary sources" so revered, so ignored by historians. It means getting back to the setting in which the theories were first stated, for no theory takes on its full original meaning except against its original setting. And most of all, it means getting back to the spirit of the age in which the ideas are first put forth, a task which the author believes can be much more successfully accomplished by serious, honest historians than the late C. Becker's often quoted passages will allow.⁴¹

³⁷ Lewis H. Haney, *History of Economic Thought* (New York 1936), p. 205.

³⁸ *Histoire de la révolution française* (Paris, 1847), pp. 515-531.

³⁹ *Théorie de l'impôt* (Paris, 1861), p. 288.

⁴⁰ Dedication page of Henry George, *Protection and Free Trade*.

⁴¹ See especially the first chapter, "Climates of Opinion," of C. Becker's *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers*. The general bent of Becker's argument is that no age can come to understand another age fully. He uses St. Thomas as an example, saying that he cannot be dismissed as unintelligent, but insisting that we moderns cannot understand his outlook, his method of reasoning, nor his conclusions. This is putting too severe of limits on human intelligence. If we cannot penetrate other "climates of opinion" we had better quit playing at the game of history and amuse ourselves with introspection or maybe a historyless sociology.

Book Reviews

Cistercian Settlements in Wales and Monmouthshire, 1140-1540, by Jeremiah F. O'Sullivan. (Fordham University Studies: History Series, No. 2.) New York. The Declan X. McMullen Co., Inc. 1947. pp. ix, 137. \$2.00

In this latest publication of the *Fordham University Studies*, Dr. O'Sullivan presents a short but exhaustive treatment of the history and influence of the Cistercian settlements both upon the religious and the political life of Wales. The four hundred year span, 1140-1540, covers the period of establishment of the abbeys in Welsh territory, their relationship to the Welsh political movements for independence, their involvement in the conflict between the Marchers and the English kings and finally their decay which terminated in dissolution under Henry VIII.

Nowhere did the Cistercian Order, as it spread throughout Europe, find a warmer welcome than in Wales. The ideals represented by the order, its emphasis upon poverty, its love of isolation and choice of remote sites for its establishments, its strictness and practice of solitude, appealed to the Welsh temperament. In addition, the fact that nearly all the first Cistercian foundations in Wales were sponsored directly from France, rather than from England, aided the order in gaining the good will of the Welsh. Previously, the

Normans had used ecclesiastical institutions to advance their power over the native population and had established Benedictine houses in the land. In reaction, the Welsh regarded the Benedictine monks as part of the alien's garrison.

The Cistercians, on the other hand, identified themselves very closely with the native Welsh fight for independence against the English. The Welshmen, as a result, recognized the Cistercians as the national religious order. Since the personnel of the settlements was Welsh, the issues of the Welsh people became a concern of every abbey and every monk within its walls. The Cistercians in Wales were undoubtedly good religious, but they were equally good Welshmen.

The Edwardian Conquest of 1284 marks the turning point both for the Welsh people and for the Cistercian settlements. Edward I defeated the Welsh army and brought the country under the crown. He recognized, however, the potentialities of the Cistercian influence and enlisted the monks as agents of cooperation with the crown. But although the monks occupied positions of authority and influence after 1284, the conquest eventually proved to be the beginning of decline for the order. The lands became feudalized and spiritual life lost its strength. Following the loss of their political position in an independent Wales, the

stercian houses became immobilized spiritually and materially. This decline continued through the difficult times of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, until a series of laws in the reign of Henry VIII ended the existence of the settlements.

Dr. O'Sullivan has made a notable contribution both to the history of Wales and to the history of monasticism in the British Isles. The average reader will find the study short if measured by the number of pages, but very heavily fortified by factual material. In fact, at times the reader will wish that the author had not taken for granted such a detailed knowledge of the events narrated and that a few words of explanation had been offered in connection with the more technical terms of feudalism, monasticism and English government. However, for the serious student of the period, and especially for the student of monasticism, this specialized study will be most welcome.

ANTHONY F. CZAJKOWSKI.

The Censoring of Diderot's Encyclopédie and the Re-established Text, by Douglas H. Gordon and Norman L. Torrey. New York. Columbia University Press. 1947. xi, 124. \$3.00

In March of 1759 its license was withdrawn from the *Encyclopédie*, and its publishers were forbidden to print any more volumes of the project. As so frequently happened under Old Regime censorship, however, the remaining ten volumes of the *Encyclopédie* were quietly printed and distributed with officials' knowledge and connivance. But unlike the first seven volumes, these last ten were not subjected to official government censorship.

The publisher Le Breton, however, imposed his own censorship on his chief editor Diderot—a fact which Diderot stumbled on by accident when he was reading final page proofs for the last volumes. The extent to which these articles were cut or altered has long been a subject of conjecture, because historians could not find original page proofs or manuscripts to reveal the content of the uncensored articles. They had to rely only on the infuriated cries of Diderot, who called Le Breton's action "an atrocity unparalleled in the history of the book trade."

In 1933 Douglas H. Gordon purchased a set of the *Encyclopédie* which included an extra volume of 300 pages of proof, which proved, upon analysis, to be the originals of the censored articles of the final ten volumes. In combination with Norman L. Torrey, an expert on the Enlightenment period, Mr. Gordon prepared *The Censoring of Diderot's Encyclopédie*, in which is included the re-established text.

One must conclude from a study of the censored pages that Le Breton did an intelligent rather than stupid job, that he was discriminating rather than severe. He censored only Diderot's and Jaucourt's articles, sometimes changing only a few lines in an entire volume. This competent study by Gordon and Torrey reveals that Diderot's accusations against Le Breton were the gross exaggerations of an outraged author, that Le Breton's censorship tended to keep Diderot's articles to

their announced objectives—which, of course, was not Diderot's objective at all. THOMAS P. NEILL.

The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, by H. G. Schenk. New York. Oxford University Press. 1947. pp. x, 28. \$3.00.

This little volume, in the "International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction" under the editorship of Karl Mannheim, derives its current interest from the obvious parallel between post-Napoleonic days and our own. Although the publisher bent toward popularization by including seventeen excellent illustrations, nevertheless Dr. Schenk has produced a scholarly study of the 1815–1825 decade which historians cannot afford to ignore. All but serious students, indeed, will be rebuffed by the copious documentation and by the abundant quotations in almost all European languages worked into the text.

The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars is chiefly an intellectual and social history of Europe for the ten years after the Congress of Vienna. In the first part it offers the best analysis this reviewer has seen of the ideological and diplomatic backgrounds of Alexander I's Holy Alliance. The major portion of the book is devoted to an examination of the domestic social scene in each of the major European countries. Its chief value lies in showing the history of the decade as a piece of whole cloth; for the diplomatic happenings of the age cannot be understood properly unless one knows the domestic problems of each nation, nor can political developments be understood unless one understands the economic and ideological developments which followed the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. All these facets of history through these ten years are nicely tied together in this work. THOMAS P. NEILL.

The Story of the Ukraine, by Clarence A. Manning. New York. Philosophical Library. 1947. pp. 326. \$3.75

Since the end of the war, sketchy but persistent reports have been reaching the outside world that the Ukraine has been the scene of outbreaks against the Soviet government. This serves to emphasize the fact that since 1922 the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has been the most troublesome of the federated states in the Soviet Union and, in consequence, has suffered the loss of millions of its hard-working and stubborn peasants.

The misfortunes of the Ukraine are not new, for its people have been suppressed for centuries. They, known originally as the Rus, were the builders of the first Russian state around Kiev and, in close contact with Constantinople, erected a prosperous and cultured realm. But the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century ended the existence of Kievan Rus and for three centuries Russia remained under Mongol rule. When finally the Mongols were driven from the country, the victory belonged not to Kiev but to the prince of Muscovy, who assumed absolute power over his liberated area. The Ukraine meantime remained a no-man's land, inhabited by Cossacks, and fought over by Poland, Muscovy and the Crimean Tartars. Poland finally estab-

lished its hegemony over the liberty-loving but wild Cossacks, but it was more nominal than real. After Poland ceded all territory east of the Dniester River to the Tsar of Russia, a consistent policy of weakening the Cossack host followed, despite repeated attempts by the Cossacks to attain independence. The final step came under Catherine the Great when all signs of autonomy were ended and the land was incorporated into Great Russia.

Ukraine's great moment for attaining independence seemed to have come at the end of World War I when the two great empires, Russia and Austria-Hungary, were torn by civil war or defeat. For a brief period a Ukrainian Republic was proclaimed, but the actions of Poland, Soviet Russia and Czecho-Slovakia put an end to the short-lived state. Nevertheless the hope of independence was not lost, but blossomed again in 1938 and 1939 as Hitler absorbed Czecho-Slovakia and dismembered Poland, but again the hopes remain unfulfilled.

Professor Manning, Assistant Professor of East European Languages at Columbia University, has attempted to present the story of the Ukraine from its origins to the present time in order to plead the cause of Ukrainian independence. Had he been content to let the facts of the centuries-old struggle speak for themselves, his story of the "nation with its own geographical area, its own population and its own history" (p. 9) might have been more effective. Instead the book is colored by the attempt to fit facts into the pattern dictated by his purpose, and the past is viewed from the viewpoint of the twentieth century. Kievan Russia is labeled an aristocratic democracy and there are repeated comparisons between the American colonies and the Cossacks to prove that there was democracy in the Ukraine's early history. In order to explain the misfortunes of the people in the centuries following the Mongol invasions, the author posits a great conspiracy on the part of all neighbors to keep the Ukrainians submerged. It might have been more accurate to view this problem as a part of the greater European scene. Similarly, it might be questioned whether the people under the Austrian government were as repressed as the author here pictures them. Under Francis Joseph the people of Galicia were permitted a large measure of autonomy and the free use of their language and worship. In the post-1918 period the people of Galicia looked back to the Austrian period as an era of peace and freedom, if not of national independence.

The author, in emphasizing the hopes of the people for independence, has not sufficiently emphasized that the Ukrainians, as a minority scattered among neighboring countries, have been used as tools to weaken the states wherein they lived. Thus the Germans employed them in 1917 in Russia, in 1938 in Czecho-Slovakia by holding out to them an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine, in 1939 in Poland by promising an autonomous union of Eastern and Western Ukraine. By their actions toward attaining the goals promised them, the unfortunate people called down upon themselves repressive measures from the threatened governments.

Even today the Ukrainian people are being used as tools, for at the formation of the United Nations, the Soviet delegates asked for and received an extra vote ostensibly on behalf of the 40,000,000 people of the supposedly autonomous Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

That a nation of 40,000,000 people deserves independence is unquestioned, but the attainment of independence presents innumerable difficulties. Aside from the vital question that freedom would have to be won from Soviet Russia, which has, by annexations from Poland, Hungary and Romania, combined all the Ukrainian people, further problems arise. Within the areas which Professor Manning calls the Ukraine, there live minorities of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, White Russians, Romanians and Hungarians, some of them in large number. These would have to be absorbed into the new state, unless the post-World War II method of expelling all non-national peoples is to be used to solve the problem. Secondly, would the establishment of a new state in the already contested Central and Eastern European arena bring about peace and stability or would it merely add another source of friction? Until the United Nations can preserve peace or some form of world government can be established, the addition of a new state would most probably be merely an added source of friction and danger.

ANTHONY F. CZAJKOWSKI.

Recognition in International Law, by H. Lauterpacht. Cambridge, at the University Press and New York: The Macmillan Company. 1947. pp. xx, 442. \$5.50

Dr. Lauterpacht, who is Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge and editor of the 5th and 6th editions of the leading treatise on International Law by Oppenheim, has enriched the science of international law with a comprehensive treatise on one of its most important subjects—a book which again gives evidence of the author's mature and profound scholarship. It is impossible in a brief review to do justice to the range of topics and problems dealt with in the present work. The reviewer will have to confine himself to pointing out the main ideas of the book which form the basis for the discussion of the various topics. In writing a monograph on recognition of states, of governments, and of belligerency the author has undertaken to deal not only with one of the most controversial subjects in international law but also with a subject "in which law and politics appear to be more closely interwoven" than in any other branch of international relations (Preface p. V).

The author states: "The majority, though not a large one, of writers deny the legal nature of the act of recognition of States" (p. 63). These writers, considering recognition a purely political act, maintain that there is no right to demand, and no duty to grant, recognition. The political view of recognition has been challenged by other writers, especially by Hall, who says: "Theoretically a politically organized community enters of right . . . into the family of states and must be treated in accordance with law, as soon as it is able to show that

possesses the marks of a state . . . no state has a right to withhold recognition when it has been earned" (International Law, § 26).

Professor Lauterpacht, too, adopts the legal view of recognition, and makes it the task of his book to expound and to defend his thesis theoretically and besides to prove that "the practice of States in the sphere of recognition contains more law and more conscious adherence to legal principle than the student has often been led to believe" (Preface p. V).

There are two traditional views of recognition, the declaratory view and the constitutive view. The first maintains that a state exists as a subject of international law prior to recognition and that recognition is merely declaratory of an existing fact; the latter holds that the state is brought into existence by the act of recognition. Between these two divergent doctrines the author takes a middle position by concluding that recognition, although declaratory of facts, is at the same time constitutive of legal consequences (p. 75).

Upon this foundation rests his main thesis that recognition of states, of governments, and of belligerency is a legal, not a political, question and that there is, therefore, an obligation to grant recognition if the requirements for recognition are fulfilled. Though there can be little objection to the soundness of the author's thesis from the theoretical viewpoint and though its universal application in practice would have the most salutary effects, yet we will have to agree with Professor Jessup, who says: "The argument of some writers that there is a duty to recognize when an aspirant actually possesses the attributes of statehood has afforded slight satisfaction in the absence of organized international machinery to enforce the obligation" (A Modern Law of Nations, 1948, p. 44).

The views and statements of the author have been thoroughly documented by quotations from, and discussions of, writers and decisions of national (Anglo-American and European) and international tribunals, and by the inclusion of hitherto unpublished opinions of the Law Officers of the Crown, given in the latter part of the 19th century.

Being a treatise on the whole subject of recognition, the book discusses also problems of recognition, such as *de Facto* recognition, withdrawal of recognition, and conditional recognition, implied recognition, and the principle of non-recognition.

Whatever publications will appear in the future, dealing with recognition in international law, Professor Lauterpacht's work will remain for a long time the basic textbook on this most important subject.

HERBERT WEINSCHEL.

The Life of James Roosevelt Bayley, First Bishop of Newark and Eighth Archbishop of Baltimore, 1814-1877, by Sister M. Hildegard Yeager, C.S.C. Washington, D. C. Catholic University Press. 1947. pp. xi, 512. \$4.50

A robust, competent and gallant piece of work! Among the thirty-six fine "Studies in American Catholic Church History, Edited by Peter Guilday and John

Tracy Ellis," it is safe to assert that there is none that surpasses "The Life of Archbishop Bayley" in its approach to the perfection of scholarly workmanship. It will stand up even with Guilday's Carroll or his England as the last word on the career of its subject. There is, however, a disparity in the scope of these studies: Guilday treats of life and times; this volume is only a life.

It is the life of James Roosevelt Bayley. You are introduced at the outset into the ancestral circle of the Bayleys, the Roosevelts and the Setons in old Harlem. Presently you single out a young man, an elect of God among them, and from that moment in your reading you never leave his company until you arrive at "Finis". Except in the copious and interesting footnotes, that if printed in the type of the text would double the size of this stout volume, there are no digressions.

You are conducted through a maze of world-stirring events, and you encounter a pageant of fascinating personages, but you are never permitted to lose sight of the future Archbishop of Baltimore. The patroons of New Amsterdam, prominent protestant clergy, particularly Dr. Samuel F. Jarvis and John Williams, a beloved classmate of Bayley, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Connecticut, and the giants among the American Catholic hierarchy, Hughes, Spalding, Kenrick, and Corrigan; Newman in England; Rome, again and again, Gregory XVI and Pius IX, the Vatican Council with its hundreds of towering intellects and very particularly among them, the youngest of them all, James Gibbons; the German Revolution of '48 and the Irish Famine—both events powerfully influencing his diocese; the Know-Nothing riots—his German church of St. Mary was burnt down; the American Civil War, the financial crash of '73, the baleful attacks of Grant and of Blaine against the Catholic Church: you are guided understandingly through all these and many incidents of lesser import, but you travel straight ahead with Bayley no matter how alluring a deviation into one or other of these side issues might promise to be. J. Russell Lowell thought the wonder of Dante's writings was their "sublime irrecognition of the unessential." This volume arouses that same wonder.

Yet, strange to say, the first pages are anything but impressive. In the first paragraph of the text the Archdiocese of Baltimore is referred to as a "primatial" see. The term occurs also in the preface. Now despite the honors and the preferences that Rome has bestowed on our American mother church, she has never recognized a "primacy" in the United States. This seems loose language in a doctoral thesis. Then the first line of the next paragraph reads: "The notable Bayley was his [our subject's] grandfather. The reading should of course have been "The first" in America. And in this same second paragraph, worst of all, you begin to be enmeshed in a series of genealogical tangles that are bewildering. A little patience, however, will bring its reward; for henceforth the story will run with such ease and brilliance that even these dark spots will receive somewhat of the illumination.

LAURENCE J. KENNY.

Economic Rivalry Between Saint Louis and Chicago, 1850-1880, by Wyatt W. Belcher. New York. Columbia University Press. pp. 223. \$3.00

Doctor Belcher dips into economic history in this "Chicago versus Saint Louis" monograph, and in so doing underscores the substantive "history" rather than the adjective "economic". He does this consciously, and the result is a readable work on a rather interesting subject. Belcher presents some significant statistical tables, but happily does not obscure the main historical material with them.

Belcher's main concern, of course, is to compare the development of the two cities through such important periods as those of the building of the Western railroads and of the Civil War, "in order to explain the rivalry between them and to determine why Chicago won over Saint Louis as the great city of the Middle West." The broad outline of his thesis is incontrovertible. Saint Louis did enjoy a superiority at mid-century, and Chicago gained commercially at the river city's expense between '50 and '80; that much is undeniable. Another premise, however, introduces a psychological phenomenon, and it is consequently more difficult to write "Q. E. D." after this part. This component of the thesis states that the Missourians, overly conscious of a strategic location on the Mississippi, settled back to a life of Southern comfort, taking it for granted that the city's superiority would, like its river, "just keep rolling along" without any special effort from local business people. While Belcher presents a certain body of evidence before advancing this interpretation, it is possible that he overemphasized the human element—the "lethargic Southerner of Saint Louis" as opposed to the Chicago "eager beaver" (if I may militarize his idea)—at the expense of his next and conclusive point: Chicago's taking the lead in rail-building while letting Saint Louis have the river trade.

The writer has quite correctly regarded the generation 1850-1880 as formative and pivotal in the struggle of the Midwestern metropolises. A perusal of the newspapers of either city during the nineties, however, will prove that the economic rivalry was still very much alive at that latter period. Consequently, it seems worth hoping that Dr. Belcher or some other competent scholar will continue the work with a study of the rivalry between 1880-1910. This period would include the Columbian Exposition and the Saint Louis World's Fair, with the economic implications of both.

Obviously, such a brief study can not "be all things to all men", and, as the very title suggests, the especial appeal of this Columbia University monograph is to the provincial-minded historian, interested in the Saint Louis or the Chicago area.

CLIFFORD J. REUTTER.

The South: Old and New, a History, 1820-1947, by Francis Butler Simkins. New York. Alfred A. Knopf. 1947. pp. xvi, 527, xx. \$4.50

The purpose of this volume is clearly stated in the preface: "to trace the development of those political and social traits which make the region between the Potomac

and the Rio Grande a cultural province conscious of its identity". The date 1820 has been selected for the opening point because it marks the appearance of the Negro question in Congress and the creation of "an instant and lasting sectional awareness".

The organization of the book falls rather easily into sections dealing with the social and economic system of the South prior to the Civil War, secession and the war, reconstruction and the return to white supremacy, development of new Southern society since the Civil War, and twentieth-century changes.

In a volume covering so extensive a period of time and touching on such varied topics as this one of necessity must, there can be no intensive development of minute details, nor has the author attempted this. He has, however, tried to present a panorama of the social, religious, intellectual, political, and economic life in the South. His judgments on such ticklish questions of Negro-white relations and its ramifications seem generally fair to this reviewer.

The author has made an excellent survey of his own work in the last two paragraphs. In this section the conclusion is reached that despite war, economic changes and cultural developments, the "provincial concepts" of the region remained the same. Among these concepts the author lists "belief in white supremacy, intensive piety, the country-gentleman ideal, devotion to cotton as the supreme staple, distinctive diet, love of home and the outdoors." The statement, however, that "in 1947 . . . the South's traditions still appeal to its people of both sexes and races" might be seriously questioned. To this reviewer the notion that "white supremacy" or "the country-gentleman ideal" appeal to the Negro of the South seems highly unlikely. Other than this too broad generalization the conclusions seem valid.

The author is a southerner, of whom his publisher says "although born to the old Southern tradition, his parents were progressive." He is now Associate Professor at the Virginia State Teachers College at Farmville and has held a post-doctoral fellowship of the Social Science Research Council. In addition to this volume, he has authored or co-authored "The Tillman Movement in South Carolina", "South Carolina During Reconstruction", "Women of the Confederacy", and "Pitchfork Ben Tillman".

A valuable critical bibliography is appended in which secondary material, both book and periodical, is discussed under appropriate chapter headings. Primary material is not listed, nor was it apparently used in preparing the volume. JASPER W. CROSS, JR.

The American Experience, by Henry Bamford Parkes. New York. Alfred A. Knopf. 1947. pp. xiv, 343, viii.

The American Experience is a challenge to American intellectuals, for its substance is the charge that they have failed adequately to formulate American ideals. Faced with the contradiction between our ideal of personal freedom and our exaltation of individuals striving for wealth and power, American thinkers have not sought the distinction in American experience, but have repudiated it.

ed it, in one extreme or another, and "borrowed European notions of class rule and distrust of the people" (p. 337). The agrarian tradition is the best statement of American ideals because it is founded upon the main conditioning element of American experience, the frontier. As Professor Parkes sees it, the task for American intellectuals is to re-state agrarian ideals in terms of the conditions of industrial society. The task has been delayed because capitalism usurped the slogans of American agrarianism, and the intellectuals have been largely preoccupied with exposing that contradiction. As a consequence, "much of American intellectual activity during the twentieth century might be summarized as a conflict between a traditionalism that lacked relevance to contemporary conditions and a realism that put forward no positive standards" (p. 273).

Such conflicts reflect underlying changes in the whole pattern of the American mind; Professor Parkes has been concerned with the whole range of activities which constitute a civilization. The figures to which the author resorts are often brilliantly illuminating as when he describes the change from optimism to pessimism or determinism in the common man in terms of American humorous standards. To the agrarian Mike Fink was the height of humor, while under the conditions of industrial society Charlie Chaplin has come to be the standard.

The book is well-written throughout and is devoid of academic jargon. Sufficient factual matter has been included to make a prior knowledge of American history unnecessary for understanding. Perhaps its greatest virtue lies in that Professor Parkes offers no solution to the American dilemma, the book is descriptive, not polemical.

R. W. McCLUGGAGE.

Since 1900: A History of the United States in Our Times, by Oscar Theodore Barck, Jr., and Nelson Manfred Blake. New York. The Macmillan Company. 1947. pp. x, 863. \$4.75

This work expresses its advantages and disadvantages in the preface—"We are well aware of the significance of recent social and cultural trends and we have tried to give them ample treatment. But we have reserved a major portion of our space for the two lines of development which seem to us most impressive—the steady expansion of the functions of government to deal with the complex problems of a new age and the increasing involvement of the United States in global politics." This statement of the authors is borne out by the book. There is little in it of social or cultural history; there is an emphasis on and generally good handling of the to-be-stressed points of governmental expansion and global politics.

Since many of the events of the period "Since 1900" are too recent for us to obtain a proper historical perspective, it is, perhaps, presently unwise to criticize the authors' viewpoints on certain controversial questions. There seems to be a definite tendency to accept such much-discussed extensions of governmental functions as the New Deal and a general approval of participation in global politics. This, however, is not carried to the point of a too-obvious bias.

A strong point of this volume is an excellent and profuse use of photographs and cartoons. If a picture (or cartoon) is worth a thousand words, the wordage of "Since 1900" is tremendous. Included among the cartoons are those of the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch's* Fitzpatrick and the St. Louis *Star-Times's* Bishop. These well-selected illustrations do much to enliven and enhance the book.

No bibliography is appended to indicate the sources which obviously were used by the authors. However, since two of these sources were undoubtedly official documents and newspaper and periodical files, a listing would be well-nigh impossible as well as tedious. However, the absence of footnotes is irritating to the student who might wish to check the authors' information and conclusions. To balance this omission—and of more value to the undergraduate who might use "Since 1900" as a text—is the section, "Suggestions for Further Reading," in which additional books are cited topically and by chapter headings.

In summary: The authors seem to have evaluated their task very well; as they declare, "The pitfalls in writing contemporary history are obvious, but the values of its study outweigh them . . . We are under no illusion that we know all the answers to urgent present-day problems, but we are convinced that no one will ever find the answers without a study of the historical background of the issues." It is too soon to know whether the authors have avoided all the "pitfalls" (and it is reasonably safe to assume they have not) but they have produced a clearly-written, readable, usable text for an undergraduate course.

The authors are members of the history department of Syracuse University.

JASPER W. CROSS, JR.

Three Generations, by Katherine Burton. New York and Toronto. Longmans, Green and Co. 1947. pp. 312. \$3.50

This is the story of three women—Maria Boyle Ewing, Ellen Ewing Sherman, Minnie Sherman Fitch—whose lives spanned more than a century, 1801 to 1913, and provided the stout warp of family continuity for the woof of their far-traveling husbands: Senator Thomas Ewing, later Secretary of the Treasury and of the Interior; "Cumpy", General William Tecumseh Sherman, who was brought up by Maria virtually as a son before he married Ellen; and Lieutenant Thomas William Fitch, U. S. Navy, a pioneer in steel, first at Saint Louis and later at Pittsburgh. The record of American history is enriched by sagas such as this, which ties much of the day-to-day homely domestic living into the better-known, more significant and more dramatic masculine events. And our American history is fast becoming poorer because material such as this is being lost or forgotten.

It may be because the author is a converted Catholic that she handles so sympathetically the relations of the first two of these women to their non-Catholic husbands, especially in the climax of the story, when the old General, so much wanting his son to perpetuate the

family name, frankly "casts a look of repugnance" at the "strange garb" which "Tom" has assumed after taking his first vows. The Church could not have chosen a more vehement *advocatus diaboli* to weld into tougher fabric the man who was to become her faithful priest.

Into this warp and woof of family life are threaded the stories of famous people who came to visit and of the great events which affected the destiny of the family and were in turn affected by the strength of character displayed by these women. The resulting pattern unrolled itself from Pittsburgh to Ohio, then on to Saint Louis and Louisiana and as far west as California, in characteristic American pioneering fashion. Life in Washington, D. C., in the battle fields of the South, during the Gold Rush, and in negotiations with the Indians of the Great Plains—in which Saint Louis University's beloved Father De Smet played so important a part—are all richly illuminated by the letters exchanged by husband and wife, conspicuously when they disclose the deep hatred of war by the man who led the march through Georgia, whose magnanimity to the defeated foe was even greater than Ellen herself could tolerate.

As a complement to better-known history, this book about women clearly shows that "They also serve who only stand and wait." CARL F. TAEUSCH.

Book Notices

Saint Margaret of Cortona, by François Mauriac, translated by Bernard Frechtman. New York. Philosophical Library. 1948. pp. xii, 231. \$3.00

This work, in the words of the author, is the "history of a soul." He has followed very understandingly and sympathetically the progress of this beautiful Italian woman of the late thirteenth century from the status of a sinner through the winding paths of penance to a sanctity in which mysticism plays a predominant role. The book will be of interest to the historian of Christian spirituality, but of no great value to the ordinary student of history. Circumstances attendant on its composition made it impossible for the author to relate his saint intimately to her historical background.

Documents of American History, two volumes in one, edited by Henry Steele Commager. Fourth edition. New York and London. Appleton-Century-Croft, Inc. 1948. pp. xxiii, 450 and 781. \$4.75

No review of this well-known volume is necessary. Suffice it here to call to the attention of the teacher and student of United States history the appearance of this fourth edition. Forty-four documents to cover the period from the United States declaration of war, in 1941, to mid-1947 have been added. This continues to be one of the handiest works of reference for American historians, particularly useful in a day when terms like the Yalta Conference, the Potsdam Conference, the Marshall Plan are so often in the news and in the classroom lecture, and the exact texts of the same are desired.

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